Co-construction of narrative in verbally able children with autism. by Smith, K.L.
2809978147

Co-construction of Narrative in Verbally Able Children
with Autism
Keren Louise Smith
D.Clin.Psy Thesis (Volume One), 2008 
University College London
UMI Number: U591B83
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U591383
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Overview
This thesis consists o f three sections. Part one is a review o f the literature on 
narrative and autism. Part two is a quantitative empirical investigation, which 
examines 20 children with autism and 26 children with learning disabilities, but not 
autism, on a collaborative story creation and narrative task. The investigation focuses 
on the abilities and deficits o f children with autism in social interaction, symbolic 
engagement, role-taking, social communication and pragmatic language. Part three is 
a critical appraisal o f the study, exploring each stage o f the research and concluding 
with a reflection upon the study limitations.
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PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Narrative and Autism
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to review the research literature on characteristics of 
narrative in autism in order to specify more clearly the relative abilities and deficits 
o f children with autism in this mode of social communication. The paper first 
considers how narrative can provide information about the way in which we 
understand and engage in social exchanges. It then provides a framework for the 
large body o f literature on narrative in typically developing children and this is 
defined within three parameters o f narrative described by Norbury and Bishop (2003). 
The review considers social communication and pragmatic language in autism before 
describing in more depth the main studies investigating narrative in autism. It 
concludes with theoretical implications of narrative ability with autism and reflects 
upon the value o f using narrative as a tool for exploring social understanding.
Narrative and Autism
“Our sensitivity to narrative provides the major link between our own 
sense o f self and our sense of others in the social world around us”
(Bruner, 1986, p.69)
There is a long research history examining the way both typically developing 
children and children with autism use language and communication. O f interest in 
more recent years has been the study o f narrative and its many facets including 
linguistic ability and pragmatics. Narrative represents more than a communicative 
tool but also cognitive and social knowledge as people are continually experiencing 
life through narrative. Through narrative, we are able to place events that may 
otherwise be isolated into an order that conveys meaning to ourselves and a listener. 
This requires some finely tuned skills such as identifying what is the important and 
relevant information to be conveyed, an appreciation o f what the listener might want 
to hear as well as points of view and comprehension o f personal positions. In this 
way, it has become apparent to researchers that narrative ability draws upon social- 
emotional competences and can be used as a useful means o f examining social 
knowledge and a means o f investigating atypical development.
The aim o f this paper is to review the research literature on narrative 
characteristics in autism in order to specify more clearly relative abilities and deficits 
in this area and how they reflect social understanding. The paper first considers how 
narrative can provide information about the way in which we communicate and 
engage in social exchanges. It then provides a framework for the large body of
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literature on narrative in typically developing children before describing in more 
depth the main studies investigating narrative in autism.
The literature was sourced from the PsycINFO database, academic search 
engine, google scholar, and papers referenced by those originally obtained.
Search terms: “Narrative/ language/ social interaction/ communication” 
combined with “autism/ development/ children/ learning disabilities”. All 
papers on narrative in autism are included and reviewed.
Narrative ability in typically developing children
Narrative development and competence has been researched extensively in typically 
developing children and provides a useful comparison for the study o f narrative in 
children with disabilities. A full review o f the research providing evidence on the 
multi faceted nature o f language, language acquisition, communication, conversation 
and narrative in typically developing children is beyond the scope o f this paper. It is 
helpful, none the less, to synthesise some o f the main elements o f narrative in order 
to set the scene for the review o f literature on narrative in autism.
Norbury and Bishop (2003) describe three main parameters o f narrative: global 
structure, local sentence structure and the use o f evaluation. Global structure refers 
to the way in which the narrator organises the fundamentals o f the story which, 
Trabasso and Stein (1994) suggest contains six main elements:
• Setting information, which provides details o f the who, when and where of 
narrative.
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• Initiating event or change in circumstance, which signals a problem that must 
be solved.
• Internal response, which are thoughts, wishes or emotions about the initiating 
events
• Explicit goal, which arises from the internal response to the initiating event.
• Attempts to achieve that goal.
• Outcome o f the narrative is reached after the attempts are made and the goal 
achieved. (Trabasso & Stein, 1994, pp. 323-349).
Bermin and Slobin (1994) condense this lengthy description into a process which is 
essentially the initial goal or problem that instigates the story, the attempts to achieve 
the goal or solve the problem and the outcome. In their book “Relating events in 
narrative: A crosslinguistic developmental study ”, these authors use (amongst other 
methods, tools and techniques) the book by Mayer (1969),“Frog, where are yo u ? ”, 
which is described in more detail later in this review. This book has been a popular 
choice amongst narrative researchers, possibly because it is a wordless picture book 
that allows a narrative to be constructed. This includes the potential for theory of 
mind analysis when, for example, the narrator knows the frog is in a certain place but 
the protagonist thinks differently. Bermin and Slobin (1994) used the frog book to 
study narrative development in typically developing native speakers of five 
languages, with ages ranging from three years to adulthood. At three years of age, 
few children across languages were able to demonstrate an onset component (e.g. the 
boy finds that the frog is missing) or all o f the subsequent components in their 
narrative. By nine years, children included most components but were still not as 
proficient as adults in the story outcome or resolution (e.g. the boy finds the frog).
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The authors also report that the development o f each component occurs at different 
ages and there are differences between the languages in the onset o f components.
Norbury and Bishop (2003) describe the next parameter, local structure, as 
basic linguistic configurations such as syntactic complexity, sentence productivity 
and referential cohesion (linking sentences together). Wigglesworth (1997) and 
Bamberg (1986, 1987) used the “Frog, where are yo u ? ” book to study local 
sentence structure and sentence cohesion. Bamberg's analysis focused on the 
introductions to the main characters, and then the way reference was switched and 
maintained throughout the narrative. He found most four-year-olds showed a 
preference for using a strategy where they choose a character as the thematic subject 
and then referred to that character with pronominals and referred to other characters 
with full nominal. He described older children as developing a mixture of strategies 
until around aged nine where they tended to use anaphoric (for example the use of 
him to refer to Jim in the sentence Bob asked him to pass the salt) strategies akin to 
adults. The results o f this study have not always been replicated, however as there 
seems to be evidence o f children using different character referencing strategies at 
differing ages (Karmiloff-Smith, 1981; Wigglesworth, 1991). Wigglesworth (1997) 
attributes some o f the conflicting evidence to differences in methodology. In her 
study she reports a clear developmental stage pattern o f the type o f referencing 
strategy used. Liles (1993) provides a detailed review o f narrative development 
literature which includes linguistic structures.
The third parameter described by Norbury and Bishop (2003) is evaluation. 
This parameter can be viewed as the basket o f tools that the narrator uses in order to 
add depth and flavour to narrative. In this way the narrator provides information that 
extends the monologue beyond a description of a set o f events and actions into a rich,
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cohesive and meaningful set of experiences. Evaluative comments can include 
explanations o f causes and consequences, mental and emotional states and character 
speech (Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1991). Kemper (1984) analysed narratives from 
children aged five and six and found there was a low use o f references to mental 
states. Kemper also found that increased age was positively correlated with the 
number o f mental state references used in narratives. In general, research in this area 
suggests that very little spontaneous mention of the mental states and motives of 
others are observed in children's narrative up until the age o f nine (Kemper, 1984), 
but some evidence o f evaluative comments has been found in children as young as 
two (Miller & Sperry, 1988).
Social communication and pragmatic language autism
According to the American Psychiatric Association (1994) and the DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria, one o f the defining characteristics o f autism is an impairment or 
deficit in communication abilities and language. Research presents a complex picture 
o f the exact nature of language deficits and abilities in autism and where skills range 
from mutism and limited communication to relatively well-developed syntactic 
capabilities and person directed speech. In typical development, the four domains of 
language (pragmatics, phonology, semantics and syntax) develop in synchrony 
whereas in children with autism there may be an uneven emergence (Lord & Paul, 
1997). The pragmatic use o f language is closely linked to narrative as well as other 
aspects o f language including specific syntactic and morphological characteristics 
(Swisher & Demetras, 1985), prosody and emotional expression (Baltaxe & 
Simmons, 1985) and semantics (Tager-Flusberg, 1981b).
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There is no single study that provides a comprehensive examination of 
pragmatic language abilities in autism and no real consensus on the precise nature of 
any underlying deficits although the literature presents a picture reflecting impaired 
functioning in many aspects even in high functioning autism (Shopler & Mesibov, 
1992). Pragmatic aspects of language are defined by Bates (1976) and cited in 
Baron-Cohen (1988) as using speech and gesture in a communicative way, 
appropriate to the social context. Fillmore (1981) further defines the pragmatic use of 
language as “a three-termed relationship that unites a) linguistic form and b) the 
communicative functions that these forms are capable of serving, with c) the contexts 
or settings in which those linguistic forms can have those communicative functions” 
(p. 144). It should be noted that research in this area uses a variety of variables 
(pragmatic feature, context) and matches their participants in different ways (IQ, 
mental age, verbal mental age) so it can be difficult to draw conclusions.
The first study to look specifically at pragmatic language characteristics in 
autism was by Baltaxe (1977) who described how adolescents with autism would 
confuse the hearer and speaker roles. Baron-Cohen (1988) describes an unpublished 
undergraduate dissertation that found that children with autism were more impaired 
than a matched comparison group in conveying thoughts, relating past experiences 
and following discourse rules (Ball, 1978). Baron-Cohen (1988) and Watson (1988) 
provide a review o f pragmatic deficits in autism that include imagination, humour, 
expressing appropriate emotions and appropriately considering the listener’s 
perspective.
Pragmatic difficulties have also been observed in speech-based conversation 
(Lord & Paul, 1997). Turn-taking has been noted to be problematic for autistic 
individuals (Ghaziuddin & Gerstein, 1996; Ramberg, Ehlers, Nyden, Johansson &
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Gillberg, 1996). Authors have also described persistent questioning that did not serve 
the function o f eliciting information (Hurtig, Ensrud & Tomblin, 1982; Prizant & 
Rydell, 1993) as well as the propensity to ask embarrassing or socially inappropriate 
questions, such as asking a stranger’s age (Langdell, 1980 cited in Baron-Cohen, 
1988). Researchers have observed more unusual aspects o f language in autism such 
as echolalia which is characterised by immediate or delayed repetition of words or 
phrases (Prizant & Duchan, 1981; Prizant & Rydell, 1984) and confusion of personal 
pronouns (Lee, Hobson & Chiat, 1994). These characteristics are not unique to 
children with autism but seem to occur more frequently and persistently than in other 
language related or developmental disabilities (Chiat, 1982).
Pragmatic competence represents more than purely the mechanics and 
structure in language, but rather is indicative or embedded within the way in which 
an individual communicates. In this way, the basic syntax or prosody o f a spoken 
sentence can be correct but the context in which it is used or consideration of the 
listener’s needs can render the sentence meaningless or inappropriate. As such, the 
pragmatics o f speech represent a communicative tool that contributes towards a 
social exchange.
One way o f examining pragmatic competence further as well as other aspects 
o f a social exchange is to look at narrative. Narrative provides a means of 
investigating the relationship between language competence and social cognition as 
well as valuable information about the way information has been perceived. 
Narrative also reveals how that information is communicated to the listener. Capps, 
Losh and Thurber (2000) discuss the application of narrative in research as a useful 
source o f information about atypical development in social knowledge. As our ability 
to narrate combines cognitive, linguistic and social skills, it provides a particularly
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appropriate tool for examining the complex interplay between these relative abilities 
and deficits in autism. These authors reflect on the wide body o f research in typically 
developing children’s narrative (providing a useful background for comparison as 
mentioned above). There is a relative dearth o f studies examining the narrative of 
children with autism or studies using narrative to look at aspects o f social cognition. 
This paucity o f research remains but the following is a description and discussion of 
the available evidence.
Narrative characteristics and the case o f  autism
In order to present a coherent review of studies looking at narrative and autism, it 
helpful to summarise the abilities required to accomplish narrative and to consider 
possible constraints in the case o f autism. Returning to Norbury and Bishop’s (2003) 
three main parameters o f narrative, it can be hypothesised that children with autism 
might be expected to experience difficulties at every level.
First, the global structure of narrative requires the speaker to comprehend a 
set o f events, organise components of a story and then report those set o f events in 
order to reach some kind o f outcome or resolution. For individuals with autism, who 
may have features o f atypical cognition, including the ability to sequence 
information (Frith, 1971, 1972) this might be quite a complex task.
Second, Norbury and Bishop (2003) describe the local structure of narrative 
as basic linguistic configurations such as syntactic complexity, sentence productivity 
and referential cohesion (linking sentences together). For individuals with autism, 
difficulties in a range of linguistic skills have been reported although the range of 
ability is wide across this group (Swisher & Demetras, 1985, Tager-Flusberg, 1981, 
Shopler & Mesibov, 1992).
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The final parameter described by Norbury and Bishop (2003) is evaluation 
which is, perhaps, the aspect of narrative likely to present the most difficulties for 
children with autism since it represents the way in which the narrator understands 
causal events and perceives other people’s minds to interpret behaviour, motivation, 
intentions and subjective states. Evaluation also incorporates having an appreciation 
of what the listener might need to know in order to share meaning. These elements 
partly reflect theory o f mind which has been reported as a common deficit amongst 
children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1988).
The following review describes studies that have looked at narrative in autism 
in chronological order and considers the empirical evidence for relative abilities and 
deficits in relation to the three parameters outlined by Norbury and Bishop (2003). 
The earlier studies in this area largely take a linguistic approach by focussing on the 
structural and pragmatic aspects narrative. Research then progressed into a more 
social domain with later studies using narrative to explore social cognition, 
perspective taking and theory of mind. Before commencing a review of each study it 
is important to note that studies in this area have often reported sample sizes which 
fall below the recommended group size in order for there to be sufficient statistical 
power to detect group differences according to Cohen (1992). With this in mind, 
each study should be considered in terms o f whether any null hypotheses reported are 
as a result o f sample size impacting on statistical power and interpreted with caution.
Narrative and autism
One of the first studies to examine narrative in autism was by Loveland, McEvoy, 
Tunali and Kelly (1990). They investigated the ability o f high-functioning verbal 
children and adolescents with autism or Down’s Syndrome to tell a story to a listener.
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They included sixteen participants in each group who were matched for 
chronological age. Participants were also matched for verbal age and nonverbal 
intelligence in order to ensure that any group differences were not due to differing 
language ability. It should be highlighted that the sample size for each group in this 
study is fairly small and therefore null findings should be interpreted with caution 
since the study may not have attained sufficient statistical power to detect group 
differences (Cohen, 1992).
Participants were asked to watch a puppet show or video tape story with 
actors. This was repeated twice. The authors explain that this difference in medium 
was due to levels o f social maturity amongst participants but two stories were 
designed to be parallel in content and structure. Each involved a central character and 
a thief who tries to steal something from the central character. After the second 
viewing, the participants were asked by a researcher to “Tell me the story. What 
happened in the story?” and their responses were video taped. Participants were also 
asked prompt questions to assess their knowledge o f factual events, understanding of 
affective information and ability to speculate about the implications o f themes given 
in the story. The responses were transcribed and coded according to general quality 
and detail o f narration, unclear references, misinterpretations, repetition and material 
that was not part o f the story. It was also noted whether the participant referred to 
characters as if  they were objects and not meaningful parts o f the story.
The results revealed that participants with autism were, to some extent, able 
to interpret events in the story and convey the basic events to the listener in a 
meaningful way. As participants were not directly assessed for memory abilities, it is 
not possible to draw a definite conclusion that the ability to recall did not influence 
results, but as all participants were able to relay basic events, the authors assume an
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adequate level o f memory. There were no significant group differences between 
narrative length and complexity. Participants with autism were more likely than the 
control group to have pragmatic problems indicative o f a limited understanding of 
both “what a story is and what it means to tell it to someone else” (p. 17). Loveland et 
al. (1990) also report that the children with autism included more bizarre or 
irrelevant items in their narrative. The follow up prompt questions suggested that 
there was little difference between the autistic and DS groups in general 
comprehension o f the story, but participants with autism did tend to give more 
inappropriate answers. The authors suggest that the inappropriate answers indicated a 
difficulty in providing appropriate responses and not necessarily a lack of story 
comprehension.
As this study included participants with Down’s Syndrome as a comparison 
group, the results suggest that children with autism have some pragmatic deficits in 
language above and beyond what is typical for children with learning disabilities 
matched for verbal ability. One limitation is that it does not include typically 
developing children as an additional comparison group. What is interesting is that the 
participants with autism seemed to attain a similar level o f story comprehension but 
then struggled to relay the story to the listener. The authors suggest that this 
observation supports Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith’s (1985) model o f “theory of 
mind” in that it reflects a lack o f understanding o f the listener’s mind. These results 
have implications for the way in which children with autism interact in a social world. 
As narrative may reflect one part o f how we relate to and interact with others, the 
ability to decipher what a listener needs to know and then relay relevant information 
in a meaningful way is essential to everyday conversation. In this way, adapting 
narrative to be audience and context appropriate may be problematic for people with
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autism, as their conversational speech has been observed to be “often inappropriate 
and uninformative to the listener” (p. 20).
Tager-Flusberg (1995) further explored narrative abilities in children with 
autism by investigating the relationship between linguistic deficits in narrating a 
story and ability to interpret story character’s actions using ‘mentalistic’ constructs. 
This sample included three groups. Children with autism, children with learning 
disabilities and typically developing children. The learning disability and autism 
groups were matched for chronological age and all three groups were closely 
matched for verbal mental age. It should be mentioned that the sample size for each 
group was relatively small (n 10) which impacts upon statistical power. The author 
acknowledges this limitation and reflects upon the difficulty experienced in 
recruiting well matched participants and also, what is described as the labour 
intensive nature o f the linguistic analyses. It could be suggested that one further 
limitation o f this study is that participants were not matched for mental age and 
therefore group differences could arguably be attributed to immature development.
In this study the 24 page wordless picture book "Frog, Where Are You?’ 
(Mayer, 1969) was chosen to elicit a story narrative from each participant. The 
participant looked through the book, page by page with the first researcher. The 
researcher then returned to the start o f the book and asked the child to tell the story to 
a second researcher while she, again, turned the pages. Each narrative was 
audiotaped and coded for length, structural complexity, story structure (to include 
conventional beginnings and endings, as well as main themes and orientation 
statements), referencing (such as shifting focus between characters and the use of 
nominal phrases) and narrative enrichment devices (to include emotional enhancers 
such as affective states and sound effects and social-cognitive enhancers such as
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mental state terms and causal statements). What these authors term ‘enrichment 
devices’, appear similar to the ‘evaluation devices’ described by Norbury and Bishop 
(2003).
The overarching findings of the Tager-Flusberg (1995) study were that both 
of the clinical groups experienced similar problems in that their stories were shorter 
than the typically developing group and showed difficulties in the story structure and 
the way in which they used referential devices. The author concludes that this finding 
suggests that these cognitive and pragmatic difficulties are not specific to autism. 
The children with autism did tend to narrate shorter stories that were less complex 
than the other two groups. This contrasts with the findings reported in the earlier 
paper by Loveland et al. (1990) who found no difference in this area between the 
group with autism and the group with Down’s syndrome. A possible explanation for 
the difference in findings is that Loveland et al. (1990) did not include a typically 
developing group for comparison and their clinical control group comprised children 
with Down’s Syndrome whose language abilities, according to these authors, are 
well known to be more impaired than their cognitive abilities and have been shown 
to produce impoverished narratives ( cf. Tager-Flusberg, 1995). They also suggest 
that there was a difference in narrative tasks operationalised in the two studies that 
may account for differences in story length. In the Loveland et al. (1990) study, the 
story was first narrated by the puppets/ actors in the story, whereas in the Tager- 
Flusberg (1995) study the participants were required to generate the narrative. Tager- 
Flusberg (1995) suggests that although, in her study, participants were matched for 
verbal comprehension, they may still have had more difficulty spontaneously 
generating the complex sentences required to narrate a story that is not evident in a 
story recall task.
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Tager-Flusberg (1995) predicted that children with autism would be less 
likely to include a range of narrative enrichment (or evaluation) devices because they 
may lack a culturally based understanding of how a story is narrated (Loveland & 
Tunali, 1993) and also because, according to the theory o f mind model (Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1986), children with autism have a reduced ability to predict 
the intentions and mental states o f the characters in the story. In fact, the findings 
did not support this prediction. The author somewhat explicates this finding by 
suggesting that some of the participants with autism may have learnt rote 
conventions o f story telling without necessarily anticipating the audiences’ 
experience o f such devices.
In terms o f quality of narrative enrichment, no participant with autism used 
any causal statements for which Tager-Flusberg suggests a number o f possible 
explanations. The children with autism produced shorter and less complex sentences 
in comparison to the other two groups which may provide some rationalisation since 
causal links and inferences may naturally extend and add complexity to a sentence. 
That said, it is not clear in this explanation in which direction the prediction lies. 
Does lack o f causal links in the autistic participant’s repertoire result in less complex 
sentences or does their propensity to generate less complex sentences limit the 
opportunity for the inclusion of causal links? Another possibility is that this result 
reflects a theory o f mind deficit in that children with autism struggled to infer 
psychological motivation or mental states in order to links events, behaviour and 
action. Further to this, if  the participants with autism were able to comprehend causal 
links in the story, perhaps deficits in their communication abilities meant that they 
did not identify that the listener might benefit from hearing about them.
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All three groups lacked the tendency to assign mental states to characters 
which contrasts previous studies which have observed children with autism as 
differing from comparison groups on this aspect o f story narration (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1986; Tager-Flusberg, 1992). It may simply be that this story offered less 
opportunity for attribution o f mental state. The small sample in each group may be a 
confounding factor in this finding and the author proposes that a story that contains a 
greater propensity for mental state terms should be used in studies with a larger 
sample in order to test this finding.
This was the first study to examine both linguistic competence and mental 
state aspects o f social cognition together and provides important indicators as to how 
they may be linked in narrative. It showed that the use o f unambiguous references 
(pragmatic skills) and narrative enrichment devices are correlated. In other words, 
the way children introduced characters and made clear shifts in focus between them 
was significantly correlated with the way in which the narrative was adapted and 
enriched in order to capture the attention o f the listener. The author regards this 
finding as support for the theory o f mind model and it also supports earlier findings 
in studies which investigate similar aspects o f narrative (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; 
Loveland et al., 1990). What is apparent here is that again, correlation does not 
necessarily denote causality and, therefore if there is a causal link between pragmatic 
language skills and social cognition, these studies do not provide evidence as to 
which direction that causal relationship is in.
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) followed up this study by further 
investigating causal attributions, mental state language and theory o f mind. This time, 
they substituted the book ‘Frog, where are yo u ? ’ (Mayer, 1969) for the book ‘Frog 
on his ow n’ (Mayer, 1973), a 28 page story, as they deemed this book to be more
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likely to elicit mental state terms. In this study they had a larger participant group 
who were also linguistically more competent. The sample was comprised of 27 with 
autism or pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified , 27 participants 
with learning disabilities and 17 typically developing participants which is 
considered an acceptable sample size for statistical power to draw conclusions about 
group findings according to Cohen (1992). They additionally asked the participants a 
series o f questions about the characters’ emotional states and investigated the 
association between narrative ability and their performance on a false belief task. In 
this way they were able to explore in more detail the relationship between narrative 
competence, linguistic ability and aspects of social cognition.
In this later study Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) found that the groups 
did not differ in their use o f mental state terms or causal statements. They did find 
that the autistic group were less accurate in naming characters’ emotions and were 
less likely to generate appropriate causal explanations. They found that narrative 
variables such as story length and the production o f cognitive state terms correlated 
with performance on the false belief tasks. The authors suggest that these findings 
indicate that narrative ability is under-pinned by social cognitive and linguistic 
abilities.
Capps, Losh and Thurber (2000) expanded upon previous studies by testing 
13 participants with autism, 13 participants with developmental delays (not Down’s 
Syndrome) and 13 typically developing children using the same book as Tager- 
Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) ‘Frog on his ow n’ (Mayer, 1973). Again, it should be 
highlighted that a group size of 13 participants may impact upon statistical power 
and therefore null findings should be viewed with caution (Cohen, 1992). This study 
matched participants for language ability and the two clinical groups were also
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matched for mental age and IQ. The authors chose this book specifically to follow on 
from Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan’s (1995) study and because it contains instances of 
deception that provide opportunities for the participant to include cognitive and 
affective mental states in their narration. A detailed description o f coding, adapted 
from Reilly, Klima and Bellugi (1991), can be located in the paper. The narratives 
were rated for length and morphosyntax (grammatical and syntax ability). Capps et al. 
(2000) also rated narrative evaluation (Norbury & Bishop, 2003) which encompassed 
elements that are not explicit in the story book but are made so in the interpretation 
o f the narrator. In repetition of the Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) study, 
participants were also given three false belief tasks and their scores averaged. Lastly, 
the two clinical groups were rated according to Capps, Kehres and Sigman’s (1998) 
specifications on an informal, semi-structured conversation with a researcher.
Although Capps, Losh and Thurber (2000) did not predict group differences 
in the length o f stories, they did find that typically developing children produced 
significantly longer stories. Interestingly, although they found that there was a non 
significant trend for two clinical groups to commit more morphological errors, the 
types o f errors across the three groups were similar in nature.
In support o f  the findings reported by Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995), in 
the Capps et al. (2000) study, groups did not differ significantly in the proportion of 
evaluation statements included in their narrative but their findings did reveal a 
significantly more restricted range of evaluation amongst the clinical groups 
highlighting that an understanding of the need to engage the audience was not absent 
but is restricted. Groups did not differ in the frequency o f references to affective and 
emotional states but the two clinical groups made causal statements about those 
cognitive and affective states less. The authors highlighted one or two sentences
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produced by the children with autism that make explicit reference to the behavioural 
manifestations o f a mental state;
“The frog ate the bug and made his mouth sad”
“And her face looks mad” (p. 199)
Further analyses revealed that the two clinical groups were more likely to make 
causal statements about action based events such as a character’s behaviour. There 
was no significant differences in the number of attention getting statements but the 
authors note that the two clinical groups tended to use less sophisticated devices than 
the typically developing group. The authors suggest that the limited causal 
explanations of characters’ internal states suggests limited appreciation o f and access 
to the social problem-solving function o f narratives. It should be highlighted here 
that this deficit was not confined to children with autism.
Amongst children with autism, theory o f mind (as indicated by the false 
belief tasks) was significantly correlated with the total proportion o f evaluation 
statements, evaluation diversity and syntactic diversity. Capps et al. (2000) suggest 
that for children with autism, theory of mind is related to two fundamental aspects of 
narrative: narrative as a social activity that involves monitoring and maintaining 
listener involvement; and narrative as a means o f elaborating a point of view 
concerning characters’ emotions, thoughts, and actions (p. 202). Specifically, theory 
of mind was positively correlated with mental state language. Surprisingly, theory of 
mind was negatively correlated with references to affective states. The authors 
explain this unanticipated finding by referring back to the finding that the 
participants with autism did not tend to make causal inferences about characters’ 
emotions. Therefore, it could be that, rather than accessing the character’s mental 
states, they are in fact labelling the emotion that is clearly and repeatedly perceptible
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in the illustration o f the character’s faces. They further this hypothesis by suggesting 
that participants with a less developed theory o f mind may have been more likely to 
use this emotion labelling strategy than those who were able to access characters’ 
mental states. This explanation is in line with Tager-Flusberg’s (1995) assertion that 
some participants with autism may have learnt rote conventions in story telling 
without necessarily developing a real comprehension o f story characters internal 
states.
Losh and Capps (2003) extended this study by utilising two discourse 
contexts- storybook narratives and narratives o f personal experience. In this way they 
include a less structured, more interactive form of narrative which is closer to 
everyday social interchanges and were thus able to consider how narrative deficits 
manifest themselves in real life exchanges. This study builds upon previous studies 
that have focused on linguistic abilities, theory o f mind and narrative competence by 
additionally examining the role o f emotional and social comprehension. The sample 
comprised of children with high functioning autism and Aperger’s Syndrome (n 28) 
and twenty two typically developing children who were matched in terms of 
chronological age and verbal IQ. The HFA and AS group were considered a single 
group as no significant differences on any measure was found between them. The 
storybook part o f this study was run using the book ‘Frog, Where Are You? ’ (Mayer, 
1969) and followed the same protocol as previous studies.
For the personal narrative, children were first told that story telling is a good 
way to get to know one another and were then asked to tell the researchers a story 
about themselves. The experimenter prompted them by suggesting they talk about a 
birthday or pet, for example. The researcher encouraged each participant to relay a 
story about a specific occasion. Both narrative contexts were coded in line with
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previous research to include length, grammatical complexity, evaluation and 
structure. The participants completed additional tasks to enable the researchers to 
assess theory of mind and emotional understanding.
Losh and Capps (2003) report few differences between groups. The groups 
told stories that were o f a similar length for the storybook narrative and the length of 
stories tended to rise for the personal accounts for both groups. In particular, there 
were few group differences between the themes and number o f stories in the personal 
narratives. The children with autism narrated the general themes o f the story book 
although tended to include fewer events. This may reflect some impairment in the 
cognitive skills necessary for global structure in narrative (Norbury & Bishop, 2003) 
such as ability to recall and sequence information.
O f interest here is that although the participants with autism told comparable 
length personal accounts to the typically developing group and these stories tended to 
be longer than in the story book condition, the actual frequency o f complex devices 
and diversity o f evaluative content of the personal stories in the autistic group was 
not as sophisticated. Therefore, as the group with autism did not use such devices 
more frequently in the longer stories, it made for a qualitatively less rich account. 
This seems highly relevant to the way in which children with HFA communicate 
within a real life social context as this study highlights the increase in social and 
cognitive demands in a more naturalistic context.
The study by Losh and Capps (2003) also highlights that the propensity to 
neglect causal statements is inherent in lower functioning and higher functioning 
individuals with autism’s narrative and that this finding transfers across contexts. It 
could be hypothesised here that the storybook condition was a more structured task 
with visual cues and therefore placed less demands on the participant than the
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unstructured, naturalistic condition. This may also bring back to the discussion the 
suggestion made by Capps et al. (2000), that the story book condition allows for an 
element of emotion-labelling that is not available for use in the personal account 
condition. In their discussion, Losh and Capps (2003) point to the way in which 
studying narratives can reveal important information about the relationship between 
social cognition, emotional understanding and narrative. They acknowledge that this 
study does not examine the nature o f such a relationship in depth but does highlight 
narrative as an important future tool to investigate these subtle and dynamic 
processes.
The Losh and Capps (2003) study is limited in that it does not include a 
comparison group o f children with other developmental disabilities and, therefore, it 
is not possible to speculate as to whether the abilities and deficits revealed are 
confined to those with autism only. Future studies could include other clinical groups 
in order to investigate this further. It may also be of worth to build upon these 
findings by including participants across a range o f functioning on the autistic 
spectrum. This may present particular problems in terms o f classification and 
matching but, if  feasible, would help to map a picture o f a range o f abilities.
Norbury and Bishop (2003) explored the relationship between structural 
language ability and pragmatic competence in narrative in children with 
communication impairments and typically developing children. This study compared 
the narrative abilities o f three clinical groups; specific language impairment (SLI, n 
17), pragmatic language impairment (PLI, n 21) and high functioning autism (HFA, 
n 12). As with previous studies, any null findings for this study should be interpreted 
with caution since the sample sizes may not be sufficient for adequate statistical 
power according to Cohen (1992).
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By comparing narrative abilities across these three groups they were able to 
investigate whether language ability is the key determinant o f narrative competency, 
pragmatic language skills are independent determinants o f narrative skills and 
whether diagnosis predicts performance. A further strength o f this study is that 18 
typically developing children of comparable age were included as a comparison 
group. Participants were given a background assessment for non-verbal ability, 
pragmatic impairment, language comprehension and expressive language. As with 
previous studies, each participant was given the book "Frog, Where are you?' 
(Mayer, 1969) which allows for some comparison of findings. Participants looked 
through the book and then told the story to a researcher.
The children’s narrative was rated for episodic structure, including the extent 
to which they could infer causal relationships between events in the story. They were 
also rated for various aspects of story length, syntax, semantics, cohesion and 
evaluation. As Loveland et al. (1990) noted more bizarre and irrelevant information 
amongst participants with autism, these authors also included a measure that assessed 
how often participants deviated from the information in the pictures.
Norbury and Bishop (2003) report no significant differences between groups 
for global structure as most children were able to relay the general gist o f the story. 
The clinical groups had more difficulties with syntactic measures than the typically 
developing children but these syntactic measures did not distinguish between the 
three clinical groups. There was no difference between the clinical groups and the 
control group on semantic measures. The authors suggest in this case, that by using a 
story portrayed in pictures, the test was not sensitive enough and that providing a 
narrative around just a title, for example, would be a more taxing and rigorous task. 
With regards to story cohesion, there were no group differences and all children
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adapted their narrative to meet listener needs when introducing and reintroducing 
characters. The authors identify that it would be helpful to match the control and SLI 
groups on various language measures and not just chronological age in order to help 
determine whether deficits in referencing can be attributed language deficits as 
opposed to skills that are yet to develop.
One novel finding in this study was the number o f ambiguous nouns that the 
participants with autism used. Norbury and Bishop (2003) suggest that the reasons 
for this are unclear and warrant further investigation. In relation to this, they found 
that all participants embellished their stories a little and that it would be difficult to 
distinguish between this and what would constitute bizarre or irrelevant information 
as described in Loveland et al. (1990). Again the authors suggest that further 
exploration of this, particularly qualitative methods, would provide more insight here.
The results for this study were unable to provide conclusive evidence for the 
second hypothesis that pragmatic skills are an independent determinant of narrative 
competence, as the clinical groups showed little difference when narrative deficits 
were found. They suggest that the SLI group may not have the level of pragmatic 
competence necessary to offset their linguistic deficits within the context o f telling a 
story.
A methodological consideration for the Norbury and Bishop (2003) study, 
and for other studies is whether it made a difference having the participants re tell the 
story to a second researcher. So, in the study by Tager-Flusberg (1995) participants 
looked through the book with a first researcher and then told the story to a second, 
naive researcher. In other studies (Norbury & Bishop, 2003) the participants were 
asked to tell the story to the same researcher that they looked through the book with. 
One might hypothesise that in this condition, participants may omit some details or
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causal explanations as they assume that the researcher already has some information 
given that they looked through the book as well. In the study by Tager-Flusberg 
(1995), the participant may be less likely to assume any knowledge of the story in the 
second researcher.
In a recent study by Diehl, Bennetto and Carter Young (2006), the story recall 
and coherence o f the narratives o f high functioning autistic children was examined. 
This study compared children with higher functioning autism (n 17) and typically 
developing children (n 17) who were matched for age, gender, language abilities and 
cognitive abilities. Once again the sample size for this study is a concern when 
considering statistical power and the interpretation o f findings.
In this study, participants listened to an audio taped version of “Frog, Where 
Are You?’’ (Mayer, 1969) while looking at the wordless picture book and is then 
asked to re-tell the story. Participants were then asked a series o f factual and 
inferential questions about the story. The Strong Narrative Assessment Procedure 
(SNAP: Strong, 1998) was used to provide data on story length, syntactic complexity, 
referential cohesion and grammar. Transcripts were also analysed for causal 
connections and causal chains (sequences of events that describe the gist o f a story) 
as well as memory for story elements, intrusions (elements that were not present in 
the original narrative) and story cohesion. Based on previous research, these authors 
predicted that children in the HFA group would not differ from the typically 
developing comparison group on measures o f story length, syntactic complexity or 
recall o f concrete story elements. They predicted that children with HFA would not 
score as highly on causal connectedness or causal chains and that their narratives 
would be less coherent due to this lack of causal connectedness.
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Diehl et al. (2006) showed that children with HFA did not differ significantly 
from the control group in number of c-units (communication unit) although the trend 
was for the control group to have slightly higher scores. There were no group 
differences in the average number of words and both groups scored similarly for 
syntactic complexity. There were also no group differences in the number of basic 
story elements recalled.
As previous papers have indicated that children with autism tend to include 
more bizarre or irrelevant story details (Loveland et al., 1990), Diehl et al. (2006) 
analysed the total number o f intrusions. They found no group difference here but 
suggest that there may not have been sufficient power in the statistical analysis to 
detect group differences. They went on to examine items o f inappropriate story 
telling and report that children with HFA showed a higher rate, although the paper 
does not describe what was considered inappropriate or how these and other 
subgroups o f intrusions were defined. This observation may, however, be in support 
of Loveland et al.’s findings which described children with autism as giving more 
inappropriate answers to prompt questions. This may be indicative o f difficulties in 
understanding what is relevant or important to the listener or which the appropriate 
items o f the story should be told, rather than a lack o f story comprehension.
In line with Diehl, et al.’s (2006) predictions, the narratives of children with 
HFA were less coherent in that they tended to list discrete events rather than use 
connective comments to provide structure. They emphasise that children with HFA 
were almost twice as likely to produce unconnected c-units. This contrasts with 
previous studies which found no difference in story structure (Loveland et al., 1990; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1995). The authors explain that the method used to analyse story 
structure in this study may have been more sensitive in that it examined
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interconnectedness as opposed to isolated components such as beginnings and 
endings.
Also in line with Diehl et al.’s (2006) predictions, children with autism did 
produce narratives with significantly lower numbers o f causal connections. Post hoc 
analyses revealed that children with HFA had a higher proportion of isolated c-units 
which were not connected in any way. This contrasted with participants from the 
typically developing comparison group whose c-units were more likely to be 
connected with three or more other units. Hence children with autism were identified 
as having less complex sentences that were less causally connected. Further to this, 
analyses revealed that while for typically developing children, the connectedness of 
their narratives was strongly correlated with the overall gist o f the story, this was not 
so for children with HFA. These results suggest that children with autism were less 
likely to use the gist o f the story to link events together and make causal inferences 
that present a coherent narrative for the listener. This seems to reflect a tendency of 
children with autism to recite a story narrative as if  it were a list o f events or actions 
rather than a cohesive account o f meaningful events.
A recent study by Garcia-Perez, Hobson and Lee (2008) used a narrative task 
to investigate aspects o f social understanding as indicated though role-taking. As 
previous studies have highlighted difficulties in children with autism in attributing 
causal attributions to characters’ emotional states (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995; 
Capps et al., 2000) as well as narratives highlighting theory o f mind deficits (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1986), this study sought to investigate abilities o f children to understand 
and shift focus from character to character by adapting Feffer’s (1970) role-taking 
task.
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Garcia-Perez et al. (2008) included a group o f participants with autism (n 15) 
and a learning disabilities group (n 15) as a comparison and they were matched for 
verbal mental age and chronological age. The authors also assessed mean length of 
utterance (MLU: Brown, 1973) in order to establish that any group differences were 
not due to differences in linguistic output. The groups were comparable in this 
respect. It can be suggested that the relatively small sample size for this study may 
have impacted upon statistical power and the detection o f group findings (Cohen, 
1992). Participants were asked to tell stories involving different characters that were 
presented as cardboard figures with various background scenes. Each participant was 
asked to tell two stories and when they had finished each story, they were then asked 
to re-tell the story from the perspective o f two more o f the characters for each story;
“Now I want you to tell me the very same story again as if  you are ”
(p. 160)
The scoring was a simplified version o f those outlined by Feffer (1970). In 
brief, the narratives were rated for overall role-taking as indicated by co-ordination 
o f story content and perspective taking as well as an index to highlight the 
participants ability to move between alternative perspectives within the same story. 
In addition, the authors added a rating of use o f psychological terms.
In this study by Garcia-Perez et al. (2008), the participants with autism were 
able to understand and engage with what is actually quite a complex task. They were 
able to create stories using cardboard characters and pretend that they were one of 
those characters or that one o f the characters represented self. Three participants with 
autism scored very highly for story co-ordination and were also able to change
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perspective within a story and so it cannot be claimed that all children with autism 
are unable to engage in role-taking tasks.
In line with previous studies, Garcia-Perez et al. (2008) showed that 
participants with autism were also able to understand the task o f re-telling the story. 
They were able to adjust their narrative in order to take on the perspectives of 
different characters which shows that this ability was not absent but rather that they 
were less proficient in this area. The authors note that the particular language used in 
this task may have made a difference to the way the children with autism responded 
to it. For example, they suggest that asking the children to be a different character 
may connote something slightly different than instructing the participant that they are 
a certain character. These are fine details which may benefit from investigation in 
future studies.
The results o f this study did show a group difference in overall role-taking 
which was more pronounced in the area of perspective taking rather than story co­
ordination. Participants with autism had more difficulty than the control group in 
taking the perspective of a new character and making another character ‘external’. 
The authors describe these two stances as adopting an ‘inner orientation’ and an 
‘outer orientation’. They also report that participants with autism were less inclined 
to move between characters’ perspectives at least once within a story- 3/15 occasions 
for autism and 9/15 for participants without autism.
O f interest is that most participants in both groups used mental state terms at 
a similar frequency. The authors stress that this does not represent a stringent theory 
o f mind test but does seem to suggest that although there were some group 
differences in overall role-taking, the differences were not attributable to a deficit in 
understanding the mental state o f another.
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Theoretical implications o f  narrative ability in autism 
The studies outlined above present a complicated picture of the relative strengths and 
deficits that children with autism have in producing narratives. Although these 
papers present empirical evidence for deficits in all three parameters o f narrative 
ability defined by Norbury and Bishop (2003), the most evident deficits fall within 
the parameter o f evaluation. As evaluation encompasses the socio-communicative 
nature of narrative, this review offers further support for the use o f narrative as an 
investigative tool in the study of social understanding and interpersonal engagement 
in autism.
The picture has been complicated in part by the use o f different 
methodologies, although this review has highlighted the strength in replicating the 
use of experimental materials and procedures to extend and develop previous 
research. In the case o f investigations into narratives in autism, this review has 
described a number o f studies that kept the experimental material constant (namely, 
the use of the Frog, where are you? book), whilst amending the procedure, 
experimental groups and rating in order to address specific questions. O f course there 
are exceptions to this which include valuable studies which have utilised different 
materials and methods.
Some methods have thrown into question who should be included in such a 
study i.e. the studies described above vary as to whether they include a typically 
developing comparison group, a comparison group with learning difficulties, or both. 
It seems that ideally both groups would be used in order to allow a distinction to be 
drawn between results that are confined to the autistic spectrum, and observations 
which are applicable to both clinical groups but not seen in typically developing 
children.
37
Further methodological considerations have involved the way in which 
participants are matched. Many studies match participants in term of linguistic ability 
in order to establish that any difference in narrative performance being attributable to 
basic language skills or talkativeness rather than to social or communicative deficits. 
This in itself presents a theoretical conundrum as, as Garcia-Perez et al. (2008) 
propose, if we consider the theory that social interaction contributes to the 
acquisition o f language then samples o f participants with higher verbal ability may 
bias the results on measures reflecting aspects of social engagement. As most of 
these studies show, in order to match the autistic and control groups for verbal ability, 
it tends to be necessary to include children who have a higher verbal age which often 
means they fall within a higher functioning category. The results may not therefore 
be generalised to lower functioning groups and studies need to be replicated across a 
range o f autistic functioning in order to map a picture o f narrative ability.
We might also question any assumed unidirectional cognitive theory of 
narrative development. Narrative development and social interaction could well 
represent more of a two way process than studies imply. The way in which we come 
to understand social processes is intricate and dynamic. Narrative ability can be 
identified as impinging on social interactions and also visa versa. Studies have 
investigated the relationship between narrative and theory of mind and 
socioemotional understanding. They conclude that poor narrative skills may be 
related to an inability to understand what the listener needs to know, and capture the 
listener’s attention. Garcia-Perez et al. (2008) provide a discussion about the merits 
of adopting a role-taking perspective to add depth to the prevalent theory of mind 
perspective by considering the degree to which the child with autism grasps self and 
other orientations and perspectives. This approach extends the cognitive or
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representational approach to assert that the child’s emotional and affective 
understanding of other people as selves is primary in their development. In this way 
we might consider deficits in narrative ability to be related to a child’s motivational 
and emotional engagement with others.
Methodological and theoretical debates aside, it is clear that the social world 
is full o f narratives that have numerous layers and subplots. These interactions 
require a child to have a deep contextual and self-other understanding in order to 
make inferences, predictions and causal attributions about other people’s mind, 
emotion and behaviour. Through studying narrative, researchers have been able to 
start to map how children with autism differ from typically developing children and 
children from other clinical groups in the way they understand and interpret the 
actions and interactions of others. Narrative can continue to provide valuable clues as 
to how children with autism perceive, interpret, engage and role-take in social 
exchange.
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PART 2: EMPIRICAL PAPER
Co-construction of Narrative in 
Verbally Able Children with Autism
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Abstract
Research presents a complex picture of social interaction, symbolic functioning and 
social communication in children with autism. The present study aims to examine the 
ability of verbally able children with autism to socially interact and symbolically 
engage in a collaborative story creation task and how this is then reflected 
participant’s narrative as this is told subsequently to a nai've listener. The study 
additionally observes role-taking in relation to the participant’s own story character 
and the character of another. These skills are considered in relation to pragmatic 
language ability. Participants were 20 children with autism and 26 children with 
learning disabilities, but not autism, who were equivalent in chronological age, oral 
expression and language productivity. Children with autism were able to engage with 
the collaborative creation of a story and re-tell the story to a naive listener. They also 
performed similarly to the comparison group in their ability to symbolically engage 
with the materials. There was a group difference in social interaction although this 
was not absent for children with autism, but atypical. O f significance is that, 
although children with autism were similar to the learning disabilities group in ability 
to role-take in relation to their own story character, there was a significant difference 
in their propensity to role-take in relation to another’s story character. For both 
groups, performance on these tasks was not related to indices of social 
communication impairment or pragmatic language skills. The results are discussed in 
terms of the complex interplay between symbolic functioning and language 
development as well as the significance of identification and the propensity to take 
on the role o f another for social interaction in children with autism.
48
Introduction
Autism is defined and classified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (APA, 1994; DSM-IV) as impairment in the areas of social interaction, 
language and communication and repetitive or stereotypical behaviours and interests. 
Further to this, the classification criteria specifies delays or abnormal functioning, 
with onset prior to the age o f 3, in social interaction, social communication and 
symbolic or imaginative play.
Language and social communication in autism
Research presents a complex picture of the exact nature o f language deficits and 
abilities in autism and language skills range from mutism and limited communication 
to relatively well-developed syntactic capabilities and person directed speech 
(Miranda-Linne & Melin, 1997). Researchers interested in the psycholinguistic 
aspects of speech in autism (e.g. Baltaxe, 1977; Lord & Paul, 1997) have focussed on 
pragmatic language and how this reflects the comprehension of social context. 
Pragmatic aspects of language are those that consider the appropriate use o f language 
within a variety o f social contexts in order that the listener is able to interpret the 
speaker’s intentions and meaning (Berko-Gleason, 2005). In autism, pragmatic 
language deficits have been well documented (Lord & Paul, 1997; Martin & 
McDonald, 2003; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996; Tager-Flusberg, 1981).
The study o f pragmatics, and in particular narrative (which involves a degree 
o f pragmatic skill), has offered one means of investigating the relationship between 
language competence and social cognition as well as providing valuable information 
about the way information has been perceived and interpreted. Narrative reflects the 
way in which an individual makes sense of the world, organises thoughts and then
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conveys meaning to a listener. It has been studied both structurally (for example 
through syntax and lexically) and through content (as with studies focussing on 
causal links or evaluative statements).
Autism and narrative
Capps, Losh and Thurber (2000) discuss the application o f narrative in research as a 
useful source o f information about atypical development in social knowledge. They 
reflect on the wide body of research in typically developing children’s narrative but 
the relative dearth o f studies examining the narrative of children with autism or 
studies using narrative to look at aspects of social cognition. However, this approach 
would seem particularly appropriate given the social-communicative deficits inherent 
in autism.
Loveland, McEvoy, Tunali and Kelley (1990) were among the first 
researchers to study narrative in autism. They showed high functioning children with 
autism and children with Down’s syndrome a puppet show or story acted by real 
actors and then asked them to tell the story. They found that participants with autism 
were, to some extent, able to interpret events in the story and convey the basic events 
to the listener in a meaningful way. There were no significant group differences 
between narrative length and complexity but participants with autism were more 
likely than the Down’s syndrome comparison group to have pragmatic problems 
indicative o f a limited understanding of both “what a story is and what it means to 
tell it to someone else” (p. 17). They also report that the children with autism 
included more bizarre or irrelevant items in their narrative.
Tager-Flusberg (1995) and Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) advanced the 
Loveland et al. (1990) study by using wordless picture books to elicit a story
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narrative from a group o f children with high functioning autism, a learning disability 
group and a group o f typically developing children. These studies investigated the 
relationship between linguistic deficits in narrating a story and their ability to 
interpret story characters’ actions using ‘mentalistic’ constructs, use of causal 
attributions and mental state language. In this way, the focus o f the analysis began to 
take on a more interpersonal interest as the researchers coded narrative for examples 
which indicated a deeper level o f story comprehension. The studies provided 
information about how these children interpreted events and actions in the story and 
also yielded evidence as to whether the children drew conclusions or made 
interpretations about the internal motivations and intentions of the characters. In 
other words, they considered how narrative could be used to identify examples of 
theory of mind. Neither study found group differences in the ability o f the children to 
identify characters’ mental states although Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) found 
that the autistic participants were less accurate in naming character’s emotions. 
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) also found that the group with autism were less 
likely to generate appropriate causal explanations which implies a deficiency in the 
way in which they perceive and interpret motivation and intention.
Capps, Losh and Thurber (2000) used a similar story-book approach 
(although included a group o f children with learning disabilities but not Down’s 
syndrome) and found that groups did not differ in the frequency o f references to 
affective and emotional states. They also found that the two clinical groups made 
causal statements about those cognitive and affective states less than typically 
developing children and were more likely to make causal statements about action 
based events such as a character’s behaviour. Amongst children with autism, theory 
of mind (as indicated by false belief tasks) was significantly correlated with the total
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proportion o f evaluation clauses (why an event happened, inferences regarding 
characters etc), evaluation diversity and syntactic diversity. Specifically, theory of 
mind was positively correlated with mental state language but, surprisingly theory of 
mind was negatively correlated with references to affective states.
Losh and Capps (2003) extended this study by including two discourse 
contexts- storybook narratives and narratives of personal experience. In this way they 
included a less structured, more interactive form of narrative which is closer to 
everyday social interchanges and were thus able to consider how narrative deficits 
manifest themselves in real life exchanges. The paper reports few differences 
between groups in the themes and number of stories in the personal narratives, 
although the actual frequency of complex devices and diversity of evaluative content 
of the personal stories in the autistic group were not as sophisticated. This study also 
highlights that the propensity to neglect causal statements is inherent in the narrative 
of lower and higher functioning individuals with autism and that this finding 
transfers across contexts.
Narrative as the outcome o f  the interpersonal process
These studies represent the growing popularity in using narrative to explore more 
than the structural complexities of language. Each paper provides information about 
the way in which the child has processed the information that they have received via 
pictures or a play and how they have interpreted and created meaning from these 
symbolic representations. As our ability to narrate combines cognitive, linguistic and 
social skills it provides a particularly appropriate tool for examining the complex 
interplay between these relative abilities and deficits in autism. It is therefore 
possible to view narrative, in this context, as an outcome. It is the outcome of a
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process that involves the child making interpretations about the interpersonal 
engagement and mental states o f the story’s characters. Narrative also requires the 
child to have some appreciation of what the listener needs to know and what might 
be interesting or relevant for them to know. What all o f these skills are indicative of 
and embedded within is a concept of oneself and other people’s minds.
Narrative and theory o f  mind
Narrative has been studied in order to reveal evidence for the way in which children 
perceive other people’s minds and understand the perspective o f another; a primary 
facet of interpersonal engagement. This ability to second guess what another person 
might be thinking is termed “theory of mind” which, as originally coined by Premack 
and W oodruff (1978) is the capacity to attribute mental states such as beliefs, desire 
and intention to oneself and others. Having theory o f mind enables us to understand 
that mental states can be the cause of behaviour and is therefore the precursor to 
predicting how another person might behave. This approach has been adopted by 
researchers such as Leslie (1987) and Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985, 1989b, 
1991) who regard the phenomena as the ability to form representations o f other 
people’s representations o f the world. The theory of mind approach has been linked, 
in particular to the social deficits inherent in autism, as these individuals typically 
display characteristics which are indicative o f a difficulty in understanding other 
people’s minds. These authors ground the inability to cognitively construe other 
people’s mental representations as the developmentally based foundation of such 
social difficulties.
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Limitations o f  theory o f  mind approach
The theory o f mind approach remains a popular feature in early social development 
research and in particular, has received much emphasis in autism research. Although 
few researchers o f autism would refute the importance o f theory of mind hypothesis 
as a key component o f the autistic presentation, it has been suggested that this 
approach may have some limitations. One limitation is that it does not satisfactorily 
explain the ‘affective’ component of interpersonal interactions. That is, 
comprehending or perceiving another may go beyond what is a cognitive 
representation o f what another may be thinking and involve other components such 
as identifying with and relating affectively to what it means to be another.
Hobson (1993) has made the distinction between cognitive representation and 
affective relatedness explicit as an alternative but complementary theory. His work 
has focussed on the hypothesis that rather than theory o f mind being both the source 
and the all encompassing theory o f social deficits in autism, affectively based deficits 
could lead to cognitive deficits as a more fundamental level o f explanation. As such, 
Hobson and colleagues have emphasised the role o f affect as the essential 
underpinning o f interpersonal relatedness. One way to think o f this is in terms of a 
child’s propensity or ability to take on the perspective or role o f another person. The 
role-taking perspective expands upon cognitive representational approaches such as 
theory o f mind, by moving beyond the cognitive processes involved in understanding 
other minds into a more affect based domain that seeks to elucidate identification or 
relatedness as involved in the interpersonal. That is, understanding the mental state 
o f another person involves experiencing what it is to be that person or to take on the 
role of other.
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Gallagher (2004) presents a complimentary approach which he terms 
“Interaction Theory”. In a similar framework to Hobson, he proposes that primary 
forms of intersubjective understanding develop at an early age and may even be 
innate. He divides the process of interpersonal engagement into two elements. These 
are Primary intersubjectivity which involves emotionally informed, embodied 
capabilities that enable us to identify the intentions o f others and Secondary 
intersubjectivity which are perceptual and action based capabilities that enable us to 
comprehend others within context.
These theories, whilst teasing out the very nature o f social interaction and 
engagement, have huge implications within the study o f autism where interpersonal 
relatedness has been regarded as a primary feature o f these individuals’ presentation.
Narrative to explore interpersonal and role-taking
Narrative is one way in which the nature o f interpersonal engagement and 
understanding in autism has been explored. A recent study by Garcla-Perez, Hobson 
and Lee (2007) used a narrative task to investigate aspects o f social understanding as 
indicated though role-taking. This study sought to investigate ability o f children to 
understand and shift focus from character to character by adapting Feffer’s (1970) 
role-taking task. It included a group of participants with autism, with a learning 
disabilities group as a comparison, and the groups were matched for verbal mental 
age and chronological age. In line with previous studies, this study showed that 
participants with autism were able to understand the task o f re-telling the story. They 
were also able to adjust their narrative in order to take on the perspective o f different 
characters, highlighting that this ability was not absent but they were less proficient 
in this area. The results o f this study did show a group difference in overall role-
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taking which was more pronounced in the area o f perspective taking rather than story 
co-ordination. Participants with autism had more difficulty than the control group in 
taking the perspective of a new character and making another character ‘external’. 
The authors describe these two stances as adopting an ‘inner orientation’ and an 
‘outer orientation’. O f interest is that most participants in each group used mental 
state terms at a similar frequency. The authors emphasise that this does not represent 
a stringent theory of mind test but does seem to suggest that although there were 
some group differences in overall role-taking, the differences were not attributable to 
a deficit in understanding the mental state of another. Given that the participants 
were also matched for verbal mental age and MLU (mean length of utterance), the 
group differences in role-taking ability were not also attributable to deficits in 
language.
Narrative, symbolic play and social development
Inherent in the ability to narrate a story is the ability to symbolise. For example, in 
order to interpret the actions of characters in a puppet show and then re-tell the story 
in meaningful way, one must first understand that those characters made out of fabric 
and wood symbolise a person. Further to this, in order to depict a sequence of events 
that has depth, flavour and meaning, one must attribute mental states such as 
intention, belief, motivation and subjective states to the characters.
How does an infant achieve this capacity to symbolise? Hobson (1993, p. 9) 
discusses the social-developmental contribution to this capacity in terms of a shared 
meaning towards an object. In this way, even in infancy, a child understands another 
person’s “psychological attitude” towards an object. They may then develop the 
capacity to recognise person-dependent rather than object-dependent meanings
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which is the beginning of the ability to symbolise. Hobson asserts that this 
triangulation o f meaning is linked to a child’s capacity for interpersonal relatedness;
“I f  this account is correct, then an infant’s capacity to relate to another 
p erso n ’s psychological relatedness to the world may have developmental 
significance fo r  the ch ild’s subsequent ability to modify his or her own 
psychological attitudes and attributions in creative symbolic p la y ”
Hobson (1993, p.9)
There is considerable empirical evidence for deficits in pretend play in children with 
autism compared with typically developing children (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Bemabei, 
Camaioni & Levi, 1999; Doherty & Rosenfeld, 1984; Gould, 1986; Ungerer and 
Sigman, 1981; Wing, Gould,Yates, & Brierley, 1977) and compared with children 
with other developmental disorders (Sigman, 1998). A failure to use toys 
symbolically is a diagnostic item on most diagnostic systems for autism (e.g., the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS: Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 
2001) and the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI-R: Rutter, Le Couteur, & Lord, 
2003).
Given that the propensity o f autistic individuals to struggle with aspects of 
social interaction involving shared attention and perspective taking has been well 
documented (Dawson, Toth, Abbott, Osterling, Munson, Estes & Liaw, 2004; 
Mundy, 1995), it can be theorised that this may impede their ability to symbolise. In 
support o f this theory, Stahmer (1995) described how teaching symbolic play skills 
to children with autism improved their symbolic play but also, incidentally, improved 
their social interaction skills suggesting a relationship between the two.
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Stanley and Konstantareas (2007) investigated the relationship between 
symbolic play and other domains such as degree of autistic symptomatology, 
language and social development. They found that social development was not 
uniquely related to symbolic play but highlighted the interconnectivity o f these areas 
of development. These findings support Hobson’s (1993) proposal which links 
language and communication, the ability to symbolise, self-reflective awareness and 
theory o f mind and frames these deficits in what he argues to be a deficiency in the 
innate propensity to develop affect based interpersonal relatedness.
Present study: The Social Feffer Task
The present study investigates the relative abilities and deficits of children with 
autism to socially interact and take on the role of another person. In order to do this 
Feffer’s (1970) task has been modified to examine social interaction and role-taking 
as demonstrated by; a) the way in which they are able to collaborate with a tester in 
order to create a story; b) their interaction with the tester’s toy character (including 
responding to the tester’s character’s subjective states) and; c) the way in which this 
social interaction is inherent in their narrative when re-telling the story as evidenced 
by adopting the role o f the tester’s character and the degree o f mutuality in the 
account. In accordance with Hobson’s (1993) interpersonal relatedness approach 
outlined in the above discussion, one hypothesis is that children with autism have 
particular difficulties in social interaction which is rooted specifically in deficits in 
the propensity to role-take and identify with another.
This study has operationalised this hypothesis by using dolls to represent the 
participant and the tester. The task required the child to engage in symbolic play as 
defined by Baron-Cohen (1987) by using the props and materials in a symbolic way.
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Moreover, it required the child to be able to relate to the characters in a symbolic 
way. In this way the child involved him or herself in “being” the character and relate 
to and interact with the tester’s character as if they represented the tester. It involved 
the child understanding and engaging with the symbolic nature o f the task and 
demonstrating social interaction and relatedness through their adoption of and 
engagement with the characters. This is evidenced by a) their ability to generate 
ideas and meanings through the use of the materials and invest in those meanings 
through the use o f materials in the story narrative and; b) their propensity to role-take 
using their own character in both the story creation and the story narrative. In line 
with H obson’s (1993) proposal that the development o f the ability to symbolise is 
linked to the propensity and ability of an individual to socially engage with another, 
the hypothesis is that children with autism are less able to use materials symbolically 
to demonstrate investment in meanings and role adoption o f characters.
Predictions fo r  between groups differences:
Children with autism who are matched with typically developing children for gender, 
chronological age, expressive and receptive vocabulary and mean length of utterance 
will show specific deficits on the Social Feffer Task, both with symbolic engagement 
with materials and in social interaction. This pattern o f group differences will be 
evident in both process (story co-creation) and outcome (narrative).
1. Children with autism will show specific deficits in social interaction in both their 
ability to collaborate with the tester in the story creation and the mutuality of 
their account in the story narrative.
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2. Children with autism will demonstrate less symbolic engagement with materials 
in both the meanings and ideas expressed through the materials in the co-creation 
and their investment in the materials in the story narrative.
3. Children with autism will show deficits in role-taking as evidenced through their 
identification and engagement with their own character and the character of the 
tester. This will be evident in the story co-creation and narrative.
Specific predictions fo r  individual differences:
4. There will be individual differences in the overall diagnostic indices of social and 
communication impairment and overall performance on the Social Feffer Task. 
More socially impaired individuals will perform less well on the Social Feffer 
Task.
5. There will be a relationship between symbolic engagement and social interaction 
on the Social Feffer Task.
In addition to the above predictions, a subsidiary set o f analyses will be run to
investigate how social communication and language ability relates to the Social
Feffer Task.
Within groups and across groups language predictions:
6.1. It is expected that individual differences in indices o f social communication 
impairment will relate to overall performance on the Social Feffer Task
6.2. It is expected that overall performance on the Social Feffer Task will be 
associated with pragmatic language abilities.
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Method
Ethics and consent
This study forms part of a larger body of research and was approved by the UCL 
Committee for Ethic of Non-NHS Human Research; Project ID: 0244/009: Dialogic 
aspects o f language disability in autism (Appendix 1). The schools had a 
longstanding relationship with the research team associated with the funded body of 
research. Each participating school was fully briefed in person as to the aims and 
procedures for the study and permission granted. Parents or responsible care-provider 
for each participant were contacted via letter to request their permission for their 
child to participate in the study. They were provided with an information sheet and 
consent form (Appendix 2).
Participants
Participants were recruited from five schools in the UK for children with autism 
and/or learning disabilities. Participants were 20 children with autistic spectrum 
disorder (18 boys, 2 girls) and 26 children with learning disabilities but without 
autism (16 boys, 10 girls). The ASD group was over represented by males but this is 
consistent with the larger population for autistic spectrum disorder (Fommbonne, 
2005). The mean chronological age for the ASD group was 12 years, 2 months and 
for the LD group 11 years, 8 months (see Table 1).
Diagnosis
Participants in the ASD group had been previously diagnosed with autism and were 
attending schools with special educational placements for autism spectrum disorders. 
In addition, it was determined through expert clinical judgment that they fulfilled
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standard DSM-IV criteria for autism (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) on the basis of semi-structured standard assessment, parent and teacher report, 
and classroom observation as follows.
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS: Lord, Rutter, 
DiLavore & Risi, 2001) was used as a standardised diagnostic measure. Module 3 
was used which is appropriate for children under 16 years of age who are verbally 
fluent (a criterion necessary for the present study) and assesses social and 
communicative behaviour associated with autism. It is comprised of 14 structured 
and unstructured tasks that are varied in nature and purpose, such as make-believe 
play, telling a story from a book and interactive tasks with the tester. Individual items 
are scored and converted into an algorithm and summed to form two domains, 
Communication and Social Interaction. These two composite scores are combined to 
create a “Communication-Social Interaction” total score which was used as both a 
diagnostic tool and as a measure of social communication impairment in the present 
study.
Parent and teacher reports on the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: 
Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles, & Bailey, 1999) were also used to confirm 
diagnosis. The SCQ is a screening instrument, which was previously known as the 
Autism Screening Questionnaire (ASQ). It is a 40-item questionnaire based on the 
original version o f the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R: Rutter, Le 
Couteur, & Lord, 2003) algorithm used for DSM-IV diagnosis o f autism. The items 
are administered as yes/ no response items. Items include “Does she/he seem to be 
unusually interested in the sight, feel, sound, taste or smell o f  things or people?”, 
“Does she/he respond positively when another child approaches her/him?”, “Does
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she/he say the same thing over and over in exactly the same way or insist that you 
say the same thing over and over again?
If there were discrepancies between scores on the ADOS and SCQ and 
previous clinical diagnoses, then participants’ diagnostic history were reviewed and a 
decision reached whether they met criteria for the ASD clinical group.
Matched criteria
As the task involved participants co-creating a story and then re-telling the story, 
they were required to have a level of language ability that would enable them to carry 
out this task. In order to limit the possibility that any group differences were due to 
dissimilarity in language ability it was important to assess whether the two groups 
had comparable skills in language. The ASD and the LD comparison group were 
matched for language competence on:
1. The Oral and Written Language Scale: Oral Expression; age equivalent 
(OWLS: Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995) was used to measure Oral Expression which 
reflects understanding and use o f spoken language. It is comprised o f 96 items 
where the examiner reads aloud verbal stimulus and shows a picture. The respondent 
answers the questions orally. The Oral Expression Scale includes four categories of 
language; lexical, syntactic, pragmatic and supralinguistic.
The test-age equivalent is calculated from the average of the test-age 
equivalents o f the four scales and represents the age at which the raw scores are 
average. For example, a participant who scores a test age equivalent of 7 years and 2 
months for Oral Expression has achieved the average score for individuals who are 7 
years and 2 months o f age. The ASD and LD groups were matched on Oral
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Expression test-age equivalent scores. As can be seen in Table 1, participants with 
and without autism were similar on scores for Oral Expression, age equivalence on 
the OWLS, (7(44) = -1.32, ns).
2. Mean Length o f  Utterance.
Participants’ speech was transcribed for both story co-creation and the story 
narrative. Mean Length of Utterance was calculated for both using the Expression, 
Reception and Recall o f Narrative Instrument (Bishop, 2004) manual as a guide. 
MLU is a measure o f linguistic productivity in children. A higher MLU is taken to 
indicate a higher level o f language proficiency. A lower MLU score may reflect that 
the participant uses predominantly single clauses with simple structure. To calculate 
MLU, the total number of words in the participants’ speech was divided by the 
number o f utterances. False starts and non words were excluded.
Example:
The boy picked some a p p les/H e  picked, urn, five apples. / Then he ate th em ./
In this example, the MLU score is 2.6 (13/5 = 2.6).
Two independent raters calculated MLU for 20% of the transcripts for both 
the story co-creation and narrative, and were found to have a Kappa reliability rating 
of .52 and .31 respectively. These were interpreted as fair to moderate according to 
Altman (1995). MLU was calculated for each participant and the means compared to 
assess similarity across the ASD and LD groups. The groups were very similar for 
Mean Length of Utterance for both co-creation, (/(44) = -1.17, ns), and Narrative 
(/(44) = 1.14, ns). See Table 1.
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Table 1
Descriptive data fo r  group matching measures
LD group
n 26
ASD group
n 20
Mean Range SD Mean Range SD
CA: Y;M 12;2 7;8-15;4 2.31 11 ;9 8;4-15;3 1.66
Oral Expression: Y;M 5;4 2;8-8;0 1.61 6;1 3;4-10;0 1.65
age equivalent 
ML U co-creation 3.09 1.48-4.66 .83 3.42 1.30-6.50 1.11
MLU narrative 4.35 2.56-6.26 .795 4.04 2.04-5 .69 1.07
Measures
1. The C hildren’s Communication Checklist-2 (CCC2: Bishop, 2003).
The CCC-2 is a 70 item checklist, designed to assess pragmatic language 
impairments which are dependent on context. It is completed by individuals who 
have observed the participant over a period o f time. For the present study, the 
checklist was completed by teachers or parents o f the participants.
Five scales assessing inappropriate initiation {“Talks too much to anyone and 
everyone”), coherence ( “Uses terms like ‘h e ’ or ‘i t ’ without making clear what 
he/she is talking about”), stereotyped language ( “Makes frequent use o f  expressions 
such as ‘by the way ‘actually ‘you know what? \ ‘well you know ’ or ‘o f  course ’ ”), 
use o f context ( “Tends to repeat back what someone has ju s t sa id”) and rapport 
( “Tends to look a away from  the person he/she is talking to: seems inattentive or 
preoccupied”) are included and combined to create a pragmatic composite score. 
Raters make a judgement about frequency for each item (0= less than once a week or 
never; 1 = at least once a week, but not every day; 2 = once or twice a day; and 3 = 
several times [more than twice] a day or always). Three summary variables are
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calculated from the completed CCC-2; the General Communication Composite 
(GCC), the Social Interaction Deviance Composite (SIDC) and the sum of scaled 
scores for pragmatic subscales (PRAG). GCC indicates children with a structural, 
pragmatic or both impairment. The SIDC, used in conjunction with the GCC 
indicates a pragmatic impairment from a structural impairment and represents 
discrepancy between general language ability and social interaction facility. A large 
negative discrepancy suggests social impairment characteristic of autism. PRAG 
indicates overall pragmatic language ability.
2. Oral and Written Language Scale- Pragmatic language subscale (OWLS: 
Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995).
The pragmatic language subscale was used from the OWLS Oral Expression Scale 
(outlined above) to measure pragmatic language competence. The pragmatic scale 
includes items which require appropriate responses to the context. Example items 
include “Sarah gave Mary a present. What should Mary say to Sarah? [courtesy 
response] ”, “Mary is looking fo r  her ball. Mother comes in. What does Mary ask 
Mother? [question] ”.
3. Social Feffer Task (SFT).
Designed for the present study, this task involved each participant co-creating a story 
using characters and materials with one researcher and then re-telling the story to a 
second researcher. The scoring criteria was a novel rating scale designed to examine 
two primary aspects of the story co-creation and story narrative. The two aspects 
were broadly defined as social interaction and symbolic engagement with materials.
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Each item was scored on a four point scale (0-3). The task and the rating scale was 
piloted on 6 children with learning disabilities in order to assess the suitability of all 
aspects of the task and subsequent coding. Pilot participants data are not included in 
the final analyses. See Appendix 6 for full scoring criteria.
Story co-creation
The focus o f the observation was on the story as created jointly by the tester and the 
participant. This involved both a) Symbolic engagement: the participant’s ability to 
generate new and creative ideas, and to become invested in and sustain his/or her 
ideas expressed through the play materials and character; as well as b) Social 
interaction: his or her propensity to be responsive to and engage with the ideas and 
subjective states o f the tester (and the tester’s character) in a truly collaborative 
manner. See Table 2.
Story narrative
The focus o f the observation was on the duality inherent in the story as re-told by the 
participant. Specifically, the interest was in how ‘what went on’ in the co-creation 
between the tester and participant became internalised within the participant’s own 
narrative. This involved a) Social Interaction: the participant’s investment with the 
mutual story/ideas, as expressed through b) Symbolic Engagement: the use of and 
adoption of materials and characters. See Table 3.
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Table 2.
Item, description and scoring examples for story co-creation
A. Symbolic Engagement
Item Title Description Scoring example
A l: Creativity The propensity and/or 
ability o f the child to 
generate new 
meanings and ideas.
0: Fails to produce new ideas.
3: Fluent in initiation and generation of 
ideas. Creative, contribute to the flow and 
smoothness o f the story.
A2 Investment with 
meanings/ideas 
as expressed 
through 
materials
The extent to which 
the meanings and 
ideas matter to the 
participant.
1: Use of materials is primarily fleeting, 
rigid or superficial.
3: Cares about the ideas and meanings as 
expressed through the play materials.
A3 Role adoption 
for own 
character
The extent to which 
the participant 
participates in the 
story through his or 
her own character.
2: Shows a preference for his or her own 
character. Adopt the character role with a 
superficial or un-sustained quality or 
conveys events in terms o f actions rather 
than experiences.
3: Adopts a role for his or her own character 
and involves him or herself in ‘being’ in 
this role. Describes events and experiences 
from the point-of-view o f  his or her own 
character
B. Social Interaction
Item Title
B 1  Responsiveness
to tester’s ideas
B2 Interaction with
tester’s 
character
B3 Interaction with
T ester
Description Scoring example
Participant’s 
responsiveness to 
ideas introduced by 
the tester.
How the participant 
(in character) interacts 
with the tester’s 
character
How the child 
responds to and 
interacts with the 
tester
1: Acknowledges the tester’s ideas (this 
could be a verbal acknowledgement or a 
physical gesture) but does not adopt, relate 
to or include them in the story.
3: Engages with the tester’s ideas. Shows 
signs o f actively incorporating the ideas of 
the tester into the story, evolving and 
developing them.
0: Does not interact with the tester’s 
character and appears unaware o f the 
character’s subjective states.
3: Active interaction between the 
characters, including appropriate 
responsiveness to the subjective states of 
the tester’s character.
1: Acknowledges/responds to the tester 
when prompted, but does not initiate 
interaction.
2: Responds to and initiates interaction with 
the tester but an unusual quality to the 
interaction -  e.g. may be controlling rather 
than collaborative
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Table 3.
Item, description and scoring examples for story narrative
C. Symbolic Engagement: Narrative
Item Title Description Scoring example
Cl Investment with 
meanings/ideas 
as expressed 
through 
materials
The extent to which 
the participant relates 
to the materials in a 
meaningful/engaged 
way during the story 
narrative.
1: Uses the materials when re-telling the 
story -  but in a fleeting, rigid or superficial 
manner.
3: Cares about the ideas and meanings as 
expressed through the play materials- clear 
in the way he or she uses the play materials 
when re-telling the story.
C2 Role adoption 
for own 
character
The extent to which 
the participant re-tells 
the story through his 
or her own character.
0: Makes little or no reference to their own 
character except when prompted to do so.
3: Adopts a role for his or her own character 
and involves him or herself in ‘being’ in 
this role. Conveys and describes events and 
experiences from the point-of-view of his or 
her own character.
C. Social Interaction: Narrative
Item Title Description Scoring example
C3 Role taking in 
relation to 
tester’s 
character
How the participant 
includes the tester’s 
character in the story 
narrative
1: Makes infrequent reference to the tester’s 
character but this is fleeting and lacks 
evidence o f relation to the role.
2: Makes consistent reference to the tester’s 
character, but this is done on the basis o f 
actions rather than experiences- focussed on 
what the tester’s character did or said -  
rather than how the character felt.
C4 Overall 
mutuality o f 
account
The degree to which 
the narrative conveys 
a sense o f mutuality 
and collaboration
0: Makes little to no reference to the ideas 
that the tester introduced, unless prompted 
to do so.
3: Conveys mutuality and collaboration. 
The ideas of the tester and of the child have 
become interwoven into a story which is a 
joint product. Able to ‘be’ both self and 
other (tester) in re-telling their joint story.
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Social Feffer Task variables defined by items
Total Score fo r  Social Feffer Task
All items were combined to give a total score for this task:
Total SFT: A l, A2, A3, B l, B2, B3, C l, C2, C3, C4
Symbolic Engagement
Items were computed as follows to create co-creation, narrative, and total variables 
for Symbolic Engagement:
SE co-creation: A l, A2, A3 
SE narrative: C l, C2.
SE all: A l. A2, A3, C l, C2
Social Interaction
Items were computed as follows to create co-creation, narrative and total variables 
for Social Interaction:
SI co-creation: B l, B2, B3.
SI narrative: C3, C4.
SI all: B 1.B2. B 3,C 3, C4.
Role taking in relation to Own and Tester’s figure
These composite scores were created to reflect role taking through own and tester’s 
character as follows:
Role-taking Own character: A3, C2.
Role-taking Tester's character: B2, C3.
70
Social Feffer Task procedure
Each participant was tested in a quiet room in their own school. There were two 
investigators involved in running the task. Researcher 1, who co-ordinated and gave 
instructions for the task, was known to the participant and introduced Researcher 2 
(the present author) to the participant in advance. The testing session was videotaped 
and transcribed. See Appendix 7 for administration manual.
The participant and both researchers sat at a desk within full view of the 
video camera. Researcher 1 took the role of the instructor and used a prescribed 
script to describe the task to the participant. Researcher 2 adopted more of a peer role 
and listened to the instructions along with the participant. Researcher 1 began the 
instructions by explaining that the participant and Researcher 2 would create a story 
together using some characters and materials. Researcher 1 laid out all of the dolls in 
front o f the participant and asked them to select which one could be them (Figure 1). 
A range o f dolls were used representing different ages, genders and ethnicity. When 
the participant had chosen, Researcher 1 asked Researcher 2 to select a doll to be 
herself. Finally, Researcher 1 selected a third doll to be in the story. This character 
was always the opposite gender from the participant in order to maximise the level of 
distinction between the three characters. Researcher 1 named the doll Ben or Jenny 
as appropriate.
Researcher 1 gave the following instructions:
Using your figures and all o f  these things, you and ‘Researcher 2 ’ are going to make 
up a story together while I  am out o f  the room.
When I  come back I  want you to tell me the story that you and ‘Researcher 2 ’ made 
up.
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Figure 1.
The participant chooses a figure to represent self.
Researcher 1 then left the room for 5 minutes.
Researcher 2 took the role of a playmate and used modelling and encouragement to 
promote mutual play (Figure 2). During the co-creation o f the story, Researcher 2 
introduced some o f her own ideas. These ideas were standardised in that they were 
taken from a prescribed list although were flexible depending on what the participant 
brought to the story. The first aim of the standardised ideas was to suggest a 
subjective state in the researcher’s character. For example, the researcher might 
pretend she was hurt, thirsty, angry or frightened. The second aim was to encourage 
aspects o f symbolic play by attributing false property to one o f the test materials or 
referring to the presence of an absent object. For example, Researcher 2 might 
pretend that the ball is a bee that stings her. Or she might pretend to climb up the 
ladder and pick some apples. See Appendix 7 for administration manual.
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Figure 2.
The participant and Researcher 2 co-create a story.
Researcher 1 returned after 5 minutes, unless Researcher 2 indicated that more time 
was needed, in which case Researcher 1 allowed a further 2 minutes. Researcher 1 
then placed all three dolls and all of the materials in front o f the participant and said;
I ’m giving all o f  the characters to you ‘Participant’ and I  want you to use all o f  the 
characters and the materials to tell me the story that you made up with ‘Researcher 
2 ’
The participant could take as much time as they required to tell the story. Researcher 
1 used the following standard prompts in order to encourage as much narrative as 
possible:
What else happened?
Would you like to add anything else about Ben/ Jenny?
Would you like to add anything else about ‘Researcher 2 ’?
Would you like to add anything else about ‘Participant’?
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Inter-rater reliability o f scoring for Social Feffer Task
Rater 1 was a placement student gaining research experience who was blind to the 
hypotheses and predictions of the study, as well as diagnoses, while Rater 2 (the 
present author) was blind to diagnosis. A coding manual was drawn up using specific 
examples to aid rating clarity where appropriate. This was accomplished by rating 
five SFT videos together and discussing the scoring. The criteria and consensus 
examples were recorded in the coding manual and used as a reference tool 
throughout rating. See Appendix 8 for coding manual.
Coding o f the remaining set of 41 cases proceeded independently, with 
reference to the coding manual. Each item was compared and tested for agreement 
between raters and a weighted Kappa value obtained (See Table 4). The Kappa 
values for each items were good to very good, according to Altman (1995).
Table 4
Inter-rater agreement fo r  Social Feffer Task
k
va lu e
Item
A l: Creativity .65
A2: Investment with meanings/ideas as expressed through materials .68
A3: Role adoption for own character .81
B l: Responsiveness to tester’s ideas .72
B2: Interaction with tester’s character .79
B3: Interaction with Tester .76
C l: Investment with meanings/ideas as expressed through materials .73
C2: Role adoption for own character .79
C3: Role taking in relation to tester’s character .68
C4: Overall mutuality of account .73
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The 5 consensus ratings and remaining 41 independent ratings by Rater 1 were used 
in the analysis to give a total sample of 46 participants.
Specific Predictions
Predictions fo r  between groups differences: Social Feffer Task.
1. Children with autism will show specific deficits in social interaction in both their 
ability to collaborate with the tester in the story creation and the mutuality of 
their account in the story narrative.
Variables: SI co-creation: (B l, B2, B3); SI narrative: (C3, C4); SI all: (B l, B2, 
B3, C3, C4)
2. Children with autism will demonstrate less symbolic engagement with materials 
in both the meanings and ideas expressed through the materials in the co-creation 
and their investment in the materials in the story narrative.
Variables: SE co-creation: (A l, A2, A3); SE narrative: (C l, C2.); SE all (A l, A2, 
A3, C 1,C2)
3. Children with autism will show deficits in role-taking as evidenced through their 
identification and engagement with their own character and the character of the 
tester. This will be evident in the story co-creation and narrative.
Variables: Role-taking own character: (A3, C2.); Role-taking Tester’s Character: 
(B2, C3).
Specific predictions fo r  individual differences:
4. There will be individual differences in social communication as measured by the 
ADOS and the Total Score for the Social Feffer Task. The higher the individual’s 
score on the ADOS, the lower their Total Score will be on the SFT.
Variables: Total SFT (A l, A2, A3, B l, B2, B3, C l, C2, C3, C4), ADOS
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5. There will be a relationship between Symbolic Engagement and Social 
Interaction on the Social Feffer Task.
Variables: Symbolic Engagement (A l, A2, A3), Social Interaction (B l, B2, B3,). 
Within groups and across groups language predictions:
6.1. It is expected that individual differences in indices o f social communication 
impairment; pragmatic language as measured by the CCC-2 will relate to the 
Total Score on the SFT
Variables: Total SFT, ADOS, CCC-2 (PRAG, GCC, SIDC)
6.2 It is expected that the Total score on the SFT will be associated with pragmatic 
language on the OWLS Oral Expression: pragmatic scale.
Variables: Total SFT, OWLS OE: Prag.
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Results
Overview
Analyses were run in accordance with the main and subsidiary predictions. This 
involved between group analyses for Social Interaction, Symbolic Engagement and 
Role-taking. The relationship between these items were then further investigated. 
The relationship between scores on the Social Feffer Task and indices of language 
were also explored.
Social Feffer Task
Descriptive data for each of the major composite variables (Symbolic Interaction, 
Social Engagement and Role-taking) were calculated for the autism group (ASD) and 
learning disabilities comparison group (LD). See Table 5.
Between group analyses
Figure 3 presents the means for the Total SFT score, Symbolic Engagement, Social 
Interaction and Role-taking. In accordance with the main predictions for the present 
study, group comparisons were made for these variables.
Group comparison fo r  Total Social Feffer Task score
When Symbolic Engagement and Social Interaction items were combined to give an 
overall score for the Social Feffer Task, analyses showed no significant group 
difference between the ASD and LD groups (t(44) = 1.31, ns, one-tailed).
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Table 5
Descriptive data for Social Feffer Task ratings
LD A SD
n 26 n 20
M ean SD R ange M ean SD R ange
S ym bolic
en gagem en t
A ll
2.41 .61 1.20-3.00 2.34 .65 .60-3.00
Sym bolic
en gagem en t
C o-creation
2.53 .63 1.00-3.00 2.45 .61 .67-3.00
S ym b olic
en gagem en t
N arrative
2.23 .77 1.00-3.00 2.18 .77 .50-3.00
S ocia l in teraction  
A ll
2 .40 .70 .80-3.00 1.99 .65 .60-3.00
S ocia l
in teraction
C o-crea tion
2.53 .66 1.00-3.00 2.17 .61 1.00-3.00
S ocia l
in teraction
N arrative
2.21 .92 .50-3.00 1.73 .84 .00-3.00
R ole-tak in g  O w n  
ch aracter
2.38 .71 1.00-3.00 2.23 .85 .00-3.00
R ole-tak in g
T e ste r ’s
ch aracter
2.38 .71 1.00-3.00 1.82 .59 .50-3.00
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Figure 3
Mean scores fo r  main variables: Total SFT score, Symbolic Engagement, Social 
Interaction and Role-taking.
Total SFT SymEng Soclnt RoleOwn RoleTest
Variable
Group Comparison fo r  Social Interaction
In accordance with prediction 1, children with autism received significantly lower 
scores than those without autism for overall indices of Social Interaction (/(44) = 
2.03, p  < .05, one-tailed). This group difference held for both the co-creation (/(44) = 
1.89, p  < .05, one-tailed), and the narrative, (7(44) = 1.85, p  < .05), one-tailed, 
sections o f the task.
In order to check that group differences in Social Interaction could not be 
attributed to the higher number o f females in the LD group, scores on Social 
Interaction were compared for girls (n = 10) and boys (n = 16) in the LD group. 
Mean scores were similar for boys (M = 2.44) and girls (M = 2.34). This suggests 
that group differences between the LD and ASD groups (where M= 1.99) could not 
be attributed to gender differences in the composition of the groups.
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When individual items for Social Interaction were reviewed, the majority of 
scores in the LD group were the highest rating of 3. For the ASD group, a rating of 2 
was the most frequent score. For example, for Bl (Responsiveness to tester’s ideas) 
62% of children in the LD group scored the maximum of 3 for this item (16 out of 
26), whereas the largest proportion of scores in the ASD group for this item was 2 (8 
out of 20, 40%). This trend was true for all items apart from item C4 (Overall 
mutuality o f account in the narrative) where the majority of scores in the ASD group 
were the maximum of 3 (8 out of 20). These results indicate that social interaction 
for children with autism was atypical rather than absent (see Figure 4).
Group Comparison fo r  Symbolic Engagement
On ratings o f Symbolic Engagement, participants with and without autism received 
very similar scores for both the co-creation and the narrative sections o f the measure, 
(^(44) = .41 and .99 respectively, ns). These results were not as predicted (prediction 
2), suggesting that, for this task, children with autism were able to engage with the 
materials similarly to the children with learning disabilities.
When scores were examined for individual items for Symbolic Engagement, 
it was clear that for each item the largest proportion o f individuals from both LD and 
ASD groups had been rated the maximum score of 3
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Figure 4
Individual scores fo r  Social Interaction items: B l, B2, B3, C3, C4.
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Group comparison fo r  Role taking in relation to Own and Tester’s figure  
The prediction that children in the ASD group would show deficits in Role-taking 
through both their Own figure and through the Tester’s figure in comparison to the 
LD group (prediction 3) was only partially borne out. Although children with and 
without autism scored similarly when adopting a Role for their Own figure, 
(7(44)= .693, ns), there were marked group differences in the propensity to relate to 
the Tester’s character through role-taking, (f(44) = 2.84, p< .05, one-tailed). 
Surprisingly, the LD group mean was the same for Role-taking in relation to Own 
character as Role-taking in relation to the Tester’s character. There was a significant 
Group x Task interaction for Role Adoption with Own vs. Other character, (F (l, 44) 
= 4.12 ,p <  .05, two-tailed). See Figure 5.
Figure 5
Mean scores fo r  Role-taking in relation to Own and Tester’s figure
Own Tester
R o le -ta k in g
Individual scores for Role-taking in relation to participant’s Own figure 
reveal that for both LD and ASD groups, the largest proportion o f scores were the 
maximum o f 3. For Role-taking in relation to the Tester’s figure, the largest
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proportion participants in the LD group were scored the maximum of 3 for both 
items (18 and 13 out o f 26) whereas a much smaller proportion of individuals in the 
ASD group scored the maximum of 3 for these items (6 and 1 out of 20). For these 
two items, the largest proportion of participants scored 2 for each item (11 and 10 out 
of 20) indicating that Role-taking in relation to the Tester’s character was not absent 
but again, atypical. See Figures 6 and 7.
Relationship between Symbolic Engagement, Social Interaction and Narrative 
In order to test the 5th prediction that Social Interaction would be associated with 
Symbolic Engagement on the SFT, correlations were examined between groups and 
across groups. There was a significant correlation between the overall index of Social 
Interaction and that of Symbolic Engagement across the groups, (r(45) = .74, 
p< .001), as well as within each group (ASD: r{ 19) = .63, p  < .01; LD r(25) = .85),
p< .001).
A review o f the scatterplot for both groups for Social Interaction and 
Symbolic Engagement (see Figure 8) reveals that there were participants in each 
group who scored low on both or high on both, suggesting that those participants 
with autism with higher levels of Social Interaction were also performing well on 
Symbolic Engagement. Given that the participants with autism were often 
performing in the atypical rather than absent range of Social Interaction, then it is not 
surprising that Symbolic Engagement scores were higher than expected.
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Scores fo r  Role-taking, Own character
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Figure 8
Scatterplot: Social Interaction and Symbolic Engagement fo r  LD and ASD groups
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Subsidiary analyses in relation to language measures
In accordance with predictions 6.1 and 6.2, analyses were carried out in order to 
investigate the role that language played both within groups and across groups in 
relation to the Social Feffer Task.
Relationship between the ADOS score and Total SFT score
Prediction 6.1 was that participants with greater social-communication impairment as 
measured by the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule would show relatively 
poor performance on the Social Feffer Task. However, among children with autism, 
scores on the ADOS were not associated with scores on the SFT, (r(19)= .14, ns), see 
Table 6. This was also the case across all the participants, (r(45) = -.14, ns).
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Relationship between the Total SFT score and indices o f  social communication 
impairment fo r  the ASD group
Prediction 6.1 was that participants with greater communication impairment; 
pragmatic language as measured by the CCD-2: PRAG, SIDC and GCC scales would 
show relatively poor performance on the Social Feffer Task. However, among 
children with autism, scores on the these scales were not associated with scores on 
the SFT, (PRAG: r(19) -  .12, ns; SIDC: r(19) = .20, ns; GCC: r(19) = -.04, ns), see 
Table 6. This was also the case across all the participants (PRAG: r(45) = .17, ns; 
SIDC: r(45) = .07, ns; GCC: r(45) = .18, ns).
Relationship between the Total SFT score and pragmatic language scores 
A further subsidiary prediction (6.2) was that, participants with greater pragmatic 
language impairment as measured by the OWLS: Oral Expression; pragmatic scale 
would show relatively poor performance on the Social Feffer Task. The analyses 
showed that, for children with autism, there was no relationship between their overall 
performance on the Social Feffer Task and their pragmatic language ability, (r(19) =- 
.31, ns), see Table 6). This was also the case across all participants (r(19) = .04, ns; 
r( 19) = .19, ns).
To summarise, Total SFT scores were not related to matching variables (CA, 
MLU, Oral Expression-age equivalence and SCQ). Total SFT Scores were also not 
related to indices of social-communication impairment (ADOS and CCC-2), and 
were not related to indices of pragmatic language (OWLS: Oral Expression: 
Pragmatic items). See Table 6.
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Table 6
Intercorrelations fo r  Total SFT score, matching variables and social communication 
and pragmatic language measures fo r  participants with autism (n 20).
score CA SCQ OE-
AE
MLU
Story
creat
e
MLU
Narr
ADOS CCC2
PRAG
ccc
2
GCC
CCC
2
SIDC
OWLS
Prag
Total —  -.31 -.09 -.13 .32 .20 .14 .12 -.04 .20 -.31
SFT
Score
CA —  -.24 .11 .04 .04 -.52* .04 .20 -.12 .35
SCQ .09 .13 .08 .22 -.24 -.15 .07 .06
OE-AE — .31 .32 .12 .51* .61** -.40 -.25
MLU .61** .11 .10 .19 -.21 .36
Story
create
MLU . . . -.07 -.05 .08 1.24 .43
Narr
ADOS — -.10 -.14 .04 -.57*
CCC2 . . . .68* .25 -.21
PRAG
CCC2 __ -.38 .05
GCC
CCC2 . . . .15
SIDC
OWLS
Prag
* p< .05, two tailed, ** p<  .01, two tailed,
CA= Chronological age, SCQ= Social Communication Questionnaire, OE-AE= Oral 
expression-Age equivalence, MLU= Mean Length of Utterance, ADOS= Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, CCC2= Child Communication Checklist-2 
(pragmatic, general communication composite and social interaction deviance 
composite scales), OWLS= Oral and Written Language Scale (pragmatic subscale).
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Discussion
This study has produced a set of results some of which were predicted while others 
were unexpected. The Social Feffer Task, as a novel paradigm, has revealed new 
information about the complex interplay between symbolic engagement, social 
interaction and role-taking in verbally able children with autism. The reliability of 
this scale was stringently tested via a second, independent rater. The rating scale was 
devised through in depth examination of pilot videos with each item considered in 
intricate detail to ensure that each observation had sound face validity. The rating 
scale was also developed in close adherence to the study hypotheses and predictions 
in order to ensure that, as far as possible, the measure reflected and encompassed 
observations associated with the study aims. It is important to note that, as a novel 
paradigm in it’s early stages, further analysis could bolster claims about reliability 
and validity. For example, the measure could be used with different populations to 
include typically developing children or children with lower functioning autism.
It was observed overall that, in accordance similar studies children with 
autism were able to engage collaboratively to create a story using figures and 
materials (Garcfa-Perez, Hobson, & Lee, 2008), and then re-tell that story to a naive 
listener (Capps, Losh & Thurber, 2000; Diehl, Bennetto & Carter Young, 2006; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1995). An overarching conclusion drawn from this study was that, 
for this sample o f children with autism, social interaction and symbolic functioning 
cannot be viewed as a universal deficit in comparison to children with learning 
disabilities when matched for overall language ability. In fact, some children with 
autism demonstrated higher level social interaction and were able to engage 
symbolically with the materials as proficiently as children with learning disabilities. 
The results also showed that children with autism were able to demonstrate role-
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taking through the use of their own toy character but were less likely than children 
with learning disabilities to take on the role of another person’s toy character. This, 
in itself, presents questions about the way in which children with autism engage with 
or identify with another. In discussing this study, therefore, the emphasis will be less 
on describing characteristics of autism in any conclusive o f definitive way but rather 
on teasing out the atypical nature of social interaction and symbolic engagement for 
this sample o f children.
Social interaction
The study had three principal predictions for group differences. The first concerned 
the way in which these participants would socially interact during this task. The 
prediction was borne out as there were significant group differences in overall social 
interaction and this trend was apparent in both the co-creation of the story and 
inherent in the child’s narrative. This meant that during the co-creation of the story, 
participants with autism tended to collaborate less well with the tester, were less 
engaged in the tester’s ideas and interacted less with the tester’s character. During 
the story narrative, participants with autism showed less evidence of adopting the 
tester’s character’s role as part of the story and the degree of mutuality in their 
account was less apparent. Whereas these group differences indicate a deficit in 
social interaction that might be considered typical for this group, the difference was 
by no means uniform across the group. All participants with autism were able to 
interact to a sufficient degree to successfully manage the story co-creation. Only one 
child with autism was excluded from analyses as he declined to re-tell the story. In 
this case, however, the assumption was that the child probably had the ability to re­
tell the story but chose not to.
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On closer inspection of individual scores for social interaction, it is apparent 
that some children with autism were functioning at an equivalent level to the 
majority of participants with learning disabilities. For example, during the story co­
creation, 35% of participants with autism scored the maximum score of 3 for 
interaction with the tester (7 out of 20) although, in comparison, 62% of children in 
the learning disabilities group scored the maximum for this item (16 out of 26). This 
was also the case for the story narrative where a similar proportion of children with 
autism scored the maximum for overall mutuality in their narrative (8 out of 20) 
suggesting that 40% of children with autism were well engaged with the mutuality of 
the task. That said, half of the children with learning disabilities demonstrated the 
same level of proficiency for this item (13 out o f 26). While these figures can be 
viewed as representing some general trends, it should be noted that quantitative 
analysis has not been carried out to examine whether these group differences are 
statistically significant for individual items.
There is also trend for the largest proportion of scores from participants in the 
autism group to fall just below the maximum (a score of 2) across most of the social 
interaction items. This observation can be further developed with a more qualitative 
description o f the results. It is therefore necessary to ask what it means to score a 2 as 
opposed to the maximum of 3 on social interaction items. It was apparent when 
scoring these items that whereas children with autism socially interacted relatively 
well with the task, there was often an unusual quality or slight nuance in the way they 
interacted which felt qualitatively different from children without autism. For 
example, for the item “Responsiveness to tester’s ideas”, which looked at how well 
the participant engaged with the tester’s ideas, participants with autism were often 
able to adopt ideas and incorporate them into the story. However, there was
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frequently little evidence of actively engaging with the tester’s ideas so that they 
evolved or expanded them. As an illustration, many o f the highest scoring 
participants took the idea of picking apples and developed it further with their own 
ideas about how many they picked, fetched the bucket to put them in or even got a 
stomach ache because they ate too many. Lower scoring participants for this item 
may have engaged briefly with the suggestion and pretended to pick apples but 
showed no sign o f progressing the story line further or adding depth or flavour to it. 
Also noticeable in the co-creation, for many participants with autism, was that 
interaction with the tester’s character or the tester herself, although not explicitly 
rejected, did not appear to be actively elicited or welcomed. Therefore, in order to 
score the maximum, the participant was required to come across as actively 
collaborating with the tester to create a story and often initiated this interaction both 
with the tester and by spontaneously including the tester’s character in their story 
ideas.
This qualitative examination of the data yields a fuller depiction that, 
although there was a statistical group difference in social interaction, children with 
autism tended to socially interact during this task in an atypical way as opposed to 
their social interaction being very limited or absent. It should be highlighted, 
however, that as the sample of children for the present study were verbally able, 
caution should be applied when considering this finding since it may not be 
representative of the broader range of children with autism.
Symbolic engagement with materials
The prediction that there would be a group difference in symbolic engagement was 
not borne out as the overall means for symbolic engagement were very similar
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between the two groups. A closer look at these results can illuminate a more detailed 
picture of how children with autism have performed in comparison with the learning 
disabilities group. The figures show that both groups tended to perform in the higher 
ranges for each item indicating that the overall standard o f symbolic engagement 
with materials was high within this sample and for the present rating scheme. This 
was not expected since there is empirical evidence for deficits in symbolic 
functioning in children with autism compared with children with other 
developmental disorders (Sigman, 1998) and failure to use toys symbolically is a 
diagnostic item on most diagnostic systems for autism (e.g., the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi 2001) and the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview (ADI-R: Rutter, Le Couteur, & Lord, 2003).
One reason for this might be to do with the specific nature of the task. 
Although it is widely reported that children with autism show deficits in their ability 
to play symbolically, studies which have examined the nature o f this deficit have also 
distinguished between spontaneous free play and play which is more instructed or 
directional (Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1993; Lewis and Boucher, 1988; Charman & 
Baron-Cohen,1997). It is possible that the symbolic play in the present study was 
guided and prompted sufficiently to facilitate engagement for this sample of children 
with autism. In addition to this, there is evidence to suggest that children with 
learning disabilities, without autism, display impairments in symbolic functioning 
(Charman, Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird & Drew, 1997). If this is the case 
then the potential for group differences in the present study may have been reduced, 
especially considering that participants were matched on associated abilities such as 
verbal proficiency.
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It could be suggested that given that the majority o f children from each group 
were scored within the higher range for symbolic engagement, the rating scale did 
not sufficiently capture a range of performance for this variable and therefore a 
ceiling effect has been created. This does not appear to be the case since there was a 
range of scores for this variable and a minority of participants from both groups who 
scored very poorly for symbolic engagement. When performance across each of the 
measures are reviewed, it can be seen that these participants also scored within the 
lower ranges for social interaction and language competence. No participants with 
learning disabilities scored 0 for any items representing symbolic engagement 
whereas one participant from the autism group scored 0 for two items which, 
interestingly, were “Role-adoption for own character” in both the story co-creation 
and story narrative. This indicates that this participant had significant difficulty in 
relating to their own story character as self. The participant also scored 0 for two of 
the other narrative items; “Role-taking in relation to the tester’s character” and 
“Overall mutuality o f the account” indicating that he/ she’s narrative was deficient in 
expression o f social interaction, role-taking and symbolic engagement.
What was evident was that some children with autism showed unusual or 
atypical ways o f symbolically engaging with the materials which the present rating 
scheme was unable to sufficiently capture. For instance, whilst generating ideas and 
meanings through the materials that were quite creative in content, they also had a 
rote or scripted quality to their ideas. To illustrate, one participant, while generating a 
range of ideas, also stuck very rigidly to the idea that there was a treasure map 
guiding each aspect of the story and this came across as being very scripted. One 
participant, while appearing to understand the principle of pretending an item stood 
for another (in this case pretending that the cup was an apple) when co-creating the
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story, went on to tell the naive listener, during her story narrative, that the tester ate 
the bucket.
These unusual observations, although present in a minority of children with 
autism, were not observed amongst children with learning disabilities. According to 
Leslie (1987), this represents a deficit in second order representation which is 
indicative of sophisticated symbolic play. In first-order representation, a child may 
use a toy as a substitute for the real thing, but not indulge in symbolic play, because 
s/he believes in the reality of the object (e.g. the toy ladder was a ladder). Second- 
order representation involves the awareness that the pretend object is something 
different such as the cup being an apple, (Williams, Reddy and Costell, 2001). These 
children tended to score within the lower ranges, or, if they showed evidence of 
symbolic engagement but appeared atypical or slightly less proficient, then they 
received a score o f 2.
There was a relationship between symbolic engagement and social interaction 
across groups as well as amongst children with autism. Although there was a group 
difference for social interaction, there was still a positive correlation across groups 
suggesting that as performance on social interaction increases, so does performance 
on symbolic engagement. What was apparent was that there were both high and low 
scorers for both social interaction and symbolic engagement in both the learning 
disabilities and autistic groups. Within the autism group, however, there were some 
participants who performed well on symbolic engagement but within the lower 
ranges for social interaction.
A recent study by Stanley and Konstantreas (2007) investigated the complex 
relationship between symbolic play in autism and other domains such as degree of 
symptomatology, receptive and expressive language and social development. They
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report that multiple symptoms of autism are required to account for a deficit in 
symbolic play and symptoms, in isolation are unlikely to do so. They did not find 
that social interaction was uniquely related to symbolic play and that nonverbal 
cognitive ability appeared to moderate this relationship. Thus, for participants whose 
nonverbal IQ scores were above the sample median, there was a significant positive 
relationship between social development and symbolic play.
The relationship between symbolic engagement and social interaction in the 
present study can therefore be considered in terms of the relative overall abilities and 
functioning o f the ASD children included in the sample. Although no measure of 
nonverbal IQ was included in the present study, the sample was comprised of 
relatively high functioning, verbally able children. It is possible therefore, that in 
accordance with the Stanley and Konstantreas (2007) study, a variety of abilities, 
including a higher verbal ability, may have impacted of the relationship between 
symbolic engagement and social interaction for children in the ASD group for this 
task. Further to this, if nonverbal IQ is a possible moderating factor for this 
relationship, it can be hypothesised that IQ may have also impacted upon the 
relationship between performance on symbolic engagement and social interaction for 
the learning disabilities group.
Role-taking
This study also investigated the ability o f children with autism to role-take through 
their own toy character and through the toy character o f the tester. There was no 
group difference for role-taking in relation to their own character. That is, children 
with autism and children with learning disabilities showed evidence that they 
identified with their toy character as self. This in itself is a rather complex
95
achievement. It suggests that participants were able to relate to the wooden doll in 
such a way that the doll came to represent themselves. Qualitatively, what this meant 
w as that during both the co-creation of the story and in the narrative, children who 
performed well for this item referred to their figure in the first person, expressed 
attitudes or subjective states, engaged in experiences through their figure and, 
essentially, involved themselves in being that character. An example of this often 
arose when the children were using one particular story prop; the magnifying glass. 
There were many clear examples of participants who held the magnifying glass to 
their doll's face when the tester suggested “why don’t you take a look?”. In contrast, 
some children who struggled to “get into” their character’s role and convey meaning 
through them, often held the magnifying glass up to their own eye, even when the 
tester had first modelled their own character looking through it. A particularly 
intriguing example came from one participant with autism who struggled to role-take 
through his figure and asked the tester to speak to him, not the doll, “No, I ’m James, 
speak to me". When the tester persisted in interacting with his doll, he found an 
inventive way to solve his problem. He “killed” his character in the story and then 
explained that he, himself was the angel of his character and therefore the tester 
should now speak directly to him!
The individual scores for role-taking in relation to own character during the 
story co-creation were very similar for both the autism group and the learning 
disabilities group where the majority of participants were able to demonstrate role- 
taking proficiently and score the highest rating (ASD group 12 out o f 20, LD group 
16 out o f 26). For the story narrative, children with learning disabilities scored 
similarly to the co-creation with half of the group scoring the highest mark. For the 
children w ith autism however, the range of scores for this item in the narrative was
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more diverse. Again, these differences have not been analysed statistically so 
comment can be made about apparent trends in order to develop a fuller 
understanding about performance on individual item but further quantitative analyses 
would need to be carried out in order test the significance o f these trends.
In support o f Garcla-Perez et al. (2008), there was a significant group 
difference in role-taking in relation the tester’s character where, overall, participants 
with autism showed less evidence of relating to or sharing the perspective of the 
tester’s character. During the story co-creation six participants with autism scored the 
maximum for interaction with the tester’s character and only one scored the 
maximum for role-taking in relation to the tester’s character in the story narrative. 
This was in comparison to 18 and 13 participants respectively from the learning 
disabilities group. Surprisingly, the LD group mean was the same for role-taking in 
relation to own character as role-taking in relation to the tester’s character, perhaps 
indicating that they were able to step into or identify with the tester’s stance with 
similar ease to that of their own.
In order for participants to score highly in this area, they needed to show 
evidence o f experiencing something o f what it was like to be the tester’s character. 
O f course this is extremely difficult to assess or to pin down in quantitative terms but 
the scoring criteria included subtle observations which were suggestive o f such role- 
taking. For example, during the story narrative, a high scoring participant for this 
item might pick up the tester’s doll and act out what happened. They would also 
convey a subjective state such as saying that the tester’s character cried because they 
hurt themselves or felt thirsty so drank tea. In essence, what was observed as 
evidence of role-taking was a participant’s description o f experiences rather than a 
purely action based account.
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The present study does not seek to provide any stringent test of theory of 
mind in that it did not require participants to explicitly attribute independent mental 
states to self and others to predict and explain actions. Rather, the emphasis was on 
the ability or propensity of the participants to mentalise and assimilate with the other 
person’s experience and then express this through the story narrative. What is 
interesting here is that although the largest proportion of individuals showed some 
evidence of role-taking in relation to the tester’s character, what appeared to be 
qualitatively lacking was the propensity to express another’s position or action in the 
story in terms o f experiences or subjective states. This would support a body of work 
by Gallagher (2001, 2004) who proposes an interaction theory o f intersubjectivity. 
The propensity of the autism group in the present study to express the tester’s 
character’s contribution to the story in terms of action based events and neglect 
expressions o f subjective states or experiences may reflect a deficit in what 
Gallagher (2004) terms “Primary Intersubjectivity”. That is, an embodied, emotion- 
informed capability to interpret the mental states o f others.
The present finding is also in accordance with Hobson’s (1993, 2002) 
research, as described in the introduction to this paper, which suggests that children 
with autism’s primary deficit is not wholly related to a deficit in cognitive 
representation o f another but is also grounded in a deficit or atypicality in the way 
they affectively relate to or share position with another. Hobson (2002), and Hobson 
and Hobson (2007) discuss this process in terms of children with autism having less 
o f a propensity to identify with others. They describe identification as a process 
whereby individuals relate to another person and incorporate some of the other 
person’s subjective reality into their own. In this way, experiences are shared 
(Hobson and Hobson, 2007, p. 415). It can be hypothesised that the group difference
98
in role taking in relation to the tester’s character and group by task interaction for 
children with autism thought of in terms of children with autism’s difficulties in 
identifying with and role-taking with another. Further to this, this finding may go 
some way towards explaining the atypicality in social interaction for participants 
with autism described above.
Language competence and the Social Feffer Task
The present study did not find a significant relationship between indices of pragmatic 
language competence and overall performance on the Social Feffer Task. This was 
unanticipated given the socially contextual nature of pragmatic language and the 
social and narrative components to this task. It does not reflect the findings of 
Loveland et al.’s (1990) study who report pragmatic language deficits amongst 
children with autism on their narrative task, even amongst the most socially 
advanced participants. However, unlike the Loveland et al study, the present study 
used a separate, standardised measure of pragmatic competence rather than an 
analysis of the narrative transcript itself. Loveland et al. coded transcripts of 
participants’ narrative for pragmatic impairment whereas the present study 
considered the relationship between standardised indices of pragmatic language and 
overall performance on the Social Feffer Task. For the present study, the finding 
suggests that language ability was not related to social interaction or symbolic 
engagement. It does not provide information about individual or group differences in 
pragmatic language use during the actual task nor specifically in relation to the story 
narrative.
In order to replicate the procedures of previous studies, it may be helpful to 
return to the individual transcripts and conduct a detailed analysis o f pragmatic
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components in order to obtain a more sensitive picture of how language ability and 
social communication were related to indices o f social engagement and symbolic 
interaction in the present study. For example, Loveland et al (1990) rated narrative 
transcripts for bizarre or irrelevant inclusions. Although the present study did not 
include this form of analysis, an informal review of the transcripts reveals possible 
idiosyncrasies amongst the narratives of some participants with autism. For example, 
some participants from the autism group included events in their narrative that were 
“surplus” to the original story created (i.e. events that did not occur during the co­
creation). Norbury and Bishop (2003) found that all participants embellished their 
stories a little although asserted that it would be difficult to distinguish between this 
and what would constitute bizarre or irrelevant information as described by Loveland 
et al. (1990). In the present study there was also one participant with autism who 
confused personal pronouns during the story narrative; a phenomenon also described 
by Lee, Hobson & Chiat (1994). Norbury and Bishop (2003) suggest that further 
qualitative exploration of narratives amongst children with autism would provide 
further insight.
The absence o f a significant relationship between the present task and 
indices o f pragmatic language could be considered in terms o f the participant’s 
overall level o f functioning. One hypothesis is that as the participants with autism 
were functioning at a relatively high level in language (at least comparable to the 
learning disabilities group), any threshold for language impairment to impede social 
interaction or the ability to symbolise has already been surpassed. What is known is 
that the development of language is linked to social interaction, theory of mind and 
symbolic ability (Hobson, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 2000), but the present study is not
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able to explain that association nor where exceptions to these relationships might 
apply.
Study limitations
In considering potential limitations of this study, it is imperative to review how the 
participants were matched, since this may have had an impact upon the results. As 
the Social Feffer task involved conversation and the ability to narrate, participants 
needed a level o f verbal ability which would enable this process to some degree. It 
was also important for participants in the two groups to have a similar level of 
language ability so that any observed group differences could not be attributable to 
one group having better linguistic skills or being more verbally productive. The two 
groups for this study were very similar for three measures of language which were 
listening comprehension, oral expression and mean length of utterance. In fact, the 
two groups were relatively verbally able. It should be highlighted that a sample 
comprised o f children who have a sophisticated level of verbal ability may somewhat 
bias the results in that there may well be a relationship between language, symbolic 
engagement and social interaction. This approach to matching should therefore be 
considered in parallel to the results and caution exercised in the interpretation of 
findings.
The sample o f children with autism as a verbally able group, were relatively 
high-functioning. The same study conducted with children with autism who were 
much less able may have yielded more pronounced differences. It may be helpful, 
therefore, for future studies to include participants who are less able and more severe 
in terms of the autistic spectrum as the present study may not be representative of the 
broader range o f children with autism.
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This sample did not include a typically developing comparison group. The 
present study did not find group differences between children with autism and 
language matched children with learning disabilities for symbolic functioning. There 
is considerable empirical evidence for deficits in pretend play in children with autism, 
compared with typically developing children (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Bernabei, 
Camaioni & Levi, 1999; Doherty & Rosenfeld, 1984; Gould, 1986; Ungerer & 
Sigman, 1981; Wing, Gould,Yates, & Brierley, 1977). Since there is evidence to 
suggest that some children with learning disabilities without autism may show 
impairments in language and symbolic functioning (Charman et al., 1997.), the 
present sample may have limited the potential for more pronounced group 
differences and, it may be helpful in future to include a typically developing group as 
an additional comparison.
Conclusion
This study investigated symbolic engagement and social interaction in two different, 
but connected contexts namely during the co-creation of a story and in the story 
narrative. Both represented slightly different facets o f these processes in that the 
story creation was an arena in which evidence of social interaction and symbolic 
engagement could be displayed as a process in the here and now and the story 
narrative represented the outcome of that process. It provided evidence about the way 
in which the participant made sense of, organised and interpreted events in the story 
co-creation. The results showed that children with autism were atypical in their social 
interaction but were able to symbolically engage at a similar level o f proficiency to 
participants with learning disabilities who were matched for chronological age, oral 
expression and mean length of utterance. Children with autism were also similar to
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children with learning disabilities in their ability to role-take through their own story 
figure, but did not show the same propensity to role-take through the figure of 
another. This may provide some explanation for their atypical way of socially 
interacting in this study. There was a strong relationship between symbolic 
engagement and social interaction in this task but overall performance was not 
related to indices o f pragmatic language competence.
The Social Feffer Task, as a novel paradigm, has presented a multifaceted 
picture of the relative strengths and deficits of children with autism in symbolic 
engagement, social interaction, role-taking abilities and considers how these relate to 
social communication. This warrants further investigation since the complex 
interplay between them, and indeed where the source o f these deficits may lie has 
important clinical implications for this group. The present study highlights the 
importance o f considering each o f these areas in order to produce a comprehensive 
clinical assessment o f individuals on the autistic spectrum (as is found in 
standardised measures such as the ADOS, 2001). It also suggests that interventions 
might be most usefully tailored to consider these domains as interrelated as opposed 
to isolated areas o f functioning.
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Critical Appraisal
This critical appraisal reflects upon and discusses the experience of conducting the 
present study. It is split into three main sections. The first section, Study preparation, 
considers the process o f selecting a project and the origins of the research questions 
and the development o f the hypotheses and predictions. The second section, Process 
and method discusses the development of the measures, rating and testing and the 
final section, Results and beyond, reflects upon the study write up, limitations and 
potential for further work.
Study preparation
Having completed a Masters in research and also been employed as a Research 
Psychologist on three separate studies prior to clinical psychology training, I had 
some ideas about the kind of research I would be interested in. A personal goal for 
my doctoral research project was to improve my ability to design a scientifically 
valid study and write it up to a high standard. It order to try and meet some of these 
criteria I contacted two academic researchers (who were colleagues within a research 
unit external to the UCL department of clinical psychology) who I had worked with 
previously and was interested in their area o f research, autism.
The present study was part of a larger funded body of work and was at the 
proposal stage. The study seemed to have a lot of potential for me as it was at the 
very early stages with a lot of scope for development. O f particular interest for me 
was the design o f the study task and the development o f a novel rating scale.
During these early stages, the task for me was to not just develop the task and 
the rating scale (which is described later), but to try to “get to grips” with what
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seemed like an overwhelming body of associated literature. I found that the most 
helpful thing to do was to narrow the literature on autism down into categories that 
directly related to my study- namely language, symbolic functioning and social 
interaction. My supervisors helped me to limit my literature review to focus on 
autism and narrative only and I found that this really helped me to think about why 
narrative might be a interesting way of investigating symbolic functioning and social 
interaction. The literature review also helped me to think about language and, in 
particular, what is known about autism and pragmatic language ability.
Further to this, I also wanted to consider the body of literature on 
identification, social role-taking and interpersonal since “self and other” seemed 
particularly important in this study. I found this area o f research to be both intriguing 
and challenging at the same time. The starting point was a paper that was co­
authored by one o f my supervisors (Garcia-Perez, Hobson & Lee, 2008) which used 
a role-taking task and story narrative (adapted from Feffer, 1970) to look at the 
ability o f children with autism to role-take and take on the perspective of others.
Process and method
In many ways, designing the experimental procedure seemed the longest and most 
labour intensive part o f the study. Care was taken to locate the appropriate materials 
for the task which comprised of 12 wooden figures and various other objects such as 
a ladder and a ball. I selected some items that had an obvious use and some for which 
the intended use was more ambiguous in order to encourage symbolic play. See 
Figure 9.
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Figure 9.
Social Feffer Task test materials
Time was then spent designing the task and developing the rating scale. The task 
itself was greatly improved by piloting at all stages of development. This helped me 
to determine how long each participant needed to co-create a story and also to assess 
which of the semi-standardised ideas introduced by the tester worked most 
effectively. It also helped me to “get a feel” for how a child might engage with the 
task and where potential problem might lie. As it happens, the task seemed to run 
fairly well from the outset and so all that was required was to decide upon what the 
semi-standardised ideas would be. At this stage I intended for these ideas to be fairly 
structured and to be introduced in quite a standard way. However, as I became more 
proficient in administering the task I realised that the ideas introduced by the tester 
could be quite flexible during the co-creation of the story and the task worked more 
successfully when my ideas were introduced in a more flexible and natural way 
through taking the child’s lead. In this way, I noted that I needed to develop a 
collaborative and mutually engaged stance in much the same way as I would be 
rating the child on!
A significant amount of time was spent fine tuning the coding sheet with 
attention paid to detail and language. Although the study was quantitative in
113
approach, the quality of the qualitative descriptions in the coding manual was crucial 
in order for it to be valid and also reliable. It was important that the coding manual 
directly reflected what had been devised as my hypotheses and related directly to my 
predictions. The temptation here could have been to include ratings on an infinite 
number of interesting aspects to the task. The final coding manual very clearly 
related to the study predictions for what was now called the “Social Feffer Task”, 
since the procedure had been adapted from Feffer’s role-taking test (Feffer, 1970). 
The primary focus o f observation was social interaction, symbolic engagement and 
role-taking during the co-creation of the story and then reflected in the child’s 
narrative.
The recruitment for this study was not problematic. The research team that I 
was based within had a long standing history of working within schools for children 
with autism and learning disabilities and fifty-five children were tested altogether of 
which forty-six met criteria for inclusion in analysis.
The study included a range o f measures aside from the Social Feffer Task. 
The procedure for allocating participants to the autism group was based on two 
standardized measures the Autistic Diagnosis Observation schedule (ADOS: Lord, 
Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 1989) and the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: 
Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles, & Bailey, 1999). If there were discrepancies 
between scores on the ADOS and SCQ and previous clinical diagnoses, then 
participants’ diagnostic history was reviewed and a decision reached whether they 
met criteria for the ASD clinical group by one o f my supervisors. This process of 
allocation to the ASD group was necessary since autism, as a spectrum disorder, can 
be complex to diagnose. Those children included in the learning disabilities
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comparison group were not considered to have traits that might warrant a diagnosis 
o f autism.
The process o f matching the two groups was important for the scientific 
validity o f the study. Some studies in similar areas have matched participants for non 
verbal IQ (Capps, Losh and Thurber, 2000; Losh and Capps, 2003; Loveland, 
McEvoy and Tunali,1990). It was decided that, since two “clinical” groups were to 
be compared (i.e. autism and learning disabilities, with no typically developing group) 
then it would be more helpful for groups to be matched for chronological age and 
language ability. The Oral and Written Language Scale: Oral Expression; age 
equivalent (OWLS: Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995) was used to measure Oral Expression 
which is designed to measure the understanding and use o f spoken language. In 
addition, I analysed the Social Feffer Task transcripts for Mean Length of Utterance 
in both the story co-creation and in the story narrative. This was a time-consuming 
process but it was imperative to be able to rule out any subsequent group differences 
being attributable to language proficiency or productivity. As it happened, the two 
groups were very similar and, if  anything, the autism had a slight advantage over the 
learning disabilities group in terms of oral expression.
As a subsidiary aspect to this study, I decided to look at language ability and 
how this related to performance on the Social Feffer Task. This may seem counter­
intuitive since the groups had been matched for language ability, however, within 
groups there was a range of language competence and it was predicted that this may 
impact upon participants performance on the Social Feffer Task. Again, a number of 
linguistic competencies could have been measured here but I decided to focus on 
pragmatic language since pragmatic language is inherently related to social
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understanding and also closely related to narrative (Lord & Paul, 1997; Berko- 
Gleason, 2005; Tager-Flusberg, 1981).
The final part to the testing process was assessing the reliability of the Social 
Feffer Task rating scale. As the author of the study I was blind to diagnosis of the 
participants at the time o f testing and rating but was not blind to the study predictions. 
Therefore, a second rater was utilised who had not been involved in the development 
o f the predictions and had no knowledge of the study other than administration 
procedures. I trained the second rater on how to score the videos and spent a 
significant amount o f time devising a coding manual that we both referred to. The 
inter-rater reliability was crucial to the scientific value of the study since, if the rating 
scale was not reliable, I could not report the findings with any confidence. The 
second rater scored independently scored 41 out o f 46 videos and the reliability was 
found to be good for all items.
Results and beyond
At the data analysis stage it is very tempting to run a variety o f analyses that may be 
interesting but do not directly to original hypotheses or predictions. If enough 
predictions are made, and enough analyses are run, then the likelihood of finding a 
significant result increases but the chance of committing a type 1 error also increases. 
On reflection, this is where carefully devised predictions grounded in well 
established theoretical hypotheses started to shape the quality o f my analyses and the 
remaining write up.
Something that I learnt during this study is that similarities between groups 
sometimes tells us more than the group differences. The importance here is 
examining the data more closely than simply acknowledging group statistics. The
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statistical data is rendered somewhat empty without thought put in to what it 
qualitatively means. For this study, a fuller picture was created of the findings by 
examining trends in scoring. In this way, I was able to glean more information about 
the performance o f children with autism on social interaction measures through 
looking at individual scores and identifying that the children with autism were 
scoring quite well for social interaction. Further to this, I reflected upon the 
qualitative nature o f their interaction, how this was atypical as opposed to absent and 
provided some examples.
This study did not include a typically developing comparison group which 
limits some o f the conclusions that can be drawn. In this way I have only been able 
to draw conclusions about how this group of children with autism compared to 
children with learning disabilities. The strength here is that I can comment upon the 
results as reflecting strengths and deficits in autism that is not reflected in children 
with learning disabilities but not autism suggesting that some characteristics are 
unique to autism. O f course a typically developing group would have strengthened 
this claim and, perhaps, more pronounced group differences would have been found. 
I did consider including a typically developing group of children in this study at an 
early stage o f the study design but decided that it was unrealistic given the time­
frame that I had. Future work might also benefit from including children with autism 
who are lower functioning since this study included a relatively able group of 
children.
I was surprised that the Social Feffer Task did not significantly correlate with 
the indices o f pragmatic language nor with the ADOS. As a novel paradigm, it has 
shown to be reliable and so I haven’t questioned whether it is a useful and valid 
measure o f the target measures. It does look at symbolic engagement and social
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interaction in two specific and unusual contexts, a story co-creation and narrative. 
My discussion provides some possible explanations for this which includes the way 
language was measured. What was apparent, when reviewing the transcripts for this 
study, is that the present rating scheme was unable to capture some of the unusual 
nuances present for children with autism. For example, one participant with autism 
showed evidence o f confusion in their use of personal pronouns. Future work might 
examine the transcripts for specific examples of pragmatic impairment which could 
then be compared to standardised indices of pragmatic language.
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U C L
O R A U U A 'I E 
SCHOOL
The G raduate School
University College London 
Gower Street London WC1E6BT
Head of the Graduate School
6 July 2005
Professor R Peter Hobson
Professor of Developmental Psychopathology
Dear Professor Hobson
Re: Notification of Ethical Approval
Project ID: 0244/009: Dialogic aspects of language disability in autism
I am pleased to confirm that the above research has been given ethical approval by the Chair 
of the UCL Committee for the Ethics of non-NHS Human Research for a period of 12 months 
from the commencement of the project (1 August 2005) subject to the following conditions:
1. It is a requirement of the Committee that research projects which have received ethical 
approval are monitored annually. Therefore, you must complete and return our 'Annual 
Continuing Review Approval Form’ PRIOR to the 1 August 2006. If your project has 
ceased or was never initiated, it is still important that you complete the form so that we 
can ensure that our records are updated accordingly.
2. You must seek Chair’s approval for proposed amendments to the research for which this 
approval has been given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and must not be 
treated as applicable to research of a similar nature. Each research project is reviewed 
separately and if there are significant changes to the research protocol you should seek 
confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the ‘Amendment Approval 
Request Form’.
The forms identified above can be accessed by logging on to the ethics website 
homepage: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/qradschool/ethics/ and clicking on the button marked 
‘Key Responsibilities of the Researcher Following Approval’.
3. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse 
events involving risks to participants or others. Both non-serious and serious adverse 
events must be reported.
Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events.
For non-serious adverse events you will need to inform , Ethics 
Committee Administrator ( ), within ten days of an adverse incident 
occurring and provide a full written report that should include any amendments to the
Tel:  
Fax:  
Email: 
Letter to Professor Hobson 06/07/2005
participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics 
Committee will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the 
next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.
Reporting Serious Adverse Events
The Ethics Committee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics 
Committee Administrator immediately the incident occurs. Where the adverse incident is 
unexpected and serious, the Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be 
terminated pending the opinion of an independent expert. The adverse event will be 
considered at the next Committee meeting and a decision will be made on the need to 
change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.
4. On completion of the research you must submit a brief report (maximum of two sides of 
A4) of your findings to the Committee. Please comment in particular on any ethical 
issues you might wish to draw to the attention of the Committee. We are particularly 
interested in comments that may help to inform the ethics of future similar research.
Yours sincerely
Chair of the UCL Committee for the Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research
Cc:  Research Fellow, Institute of Child Health
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UCL Institute of Child Health
31st August, 2007 
INFORMATION SHEET
Name of project: Collaborative Competence in Dialogue
Name of investigators: Dr. Jessica Hobson & Prof. Peter Hobson (with Keren Smith)
Dear Parent or Carer of Child’s name
I am writing to ask you for your permission to include X in the above project. In this 
letter I would like to introduce our Unit and project, and describe what is involved for 
those children who take part. We have been working with typically developing 
children and children with autism spectrum disorders for many years, to better 
understand the abilities and difficulties in autism. We are very grateful to X School 
for supporting our work, as well as the families who agree to participate in our 
projects.
We are undertaking a project to study how the ability to understand and adopt 
communicative roles relates to the development of flexible language skills. 
Understanding these questions may be helpful in further developing ways to foster 
social and cognitive development. This particular project is looking at language, 
symbolic engagement and social interaction.
What does the project involve? During 4 visits to X School we will meet with X for 
brief sessions lasting about 30 minutes. During this time, we will assess her ability 
to interact and communicate with another person using a range of specially 
designed tasks, which are designed to be informative to us as well as fun for your 
child to engage in. A brief report of your child’s language and social skills based on 
the sessions will be sent to your school.
We will need to videotape the measure in order to score it. These tapes will be 
made anonymous and stored in a locked filing cabinet at the Institute of Child Health 
in London where our research team is based. If you have a particular wish to view 
the tape we can provide excerpts for you. The task has been rigorously developed, 
and will be informative to us, but also fun for the children who take part. We intend 
to publish the results of this project once it is completed to communicate our findings 
to a wide audience of parents and professionals. The results will be presented in a 
way that prevents the identification of any one chid, and strict confidentiality is 
assured. If you have any questions, please send an email to 
. You may also reach us by telephone on .
We would be very grateful if you would consider taking part but you are in no way 
obligated to do so. Your child’s education or care will not be affected. If you choose 
to do so, please could you complete the attached consent form (keep one copy for 
yourself) and return it to school with X by February 15th. You are free to withdraw 
from the study at any point without giving a reason for doing so.
Yours sincerely,
Jessica Hobson
PhD Senior Research Fellow
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CONSENT FORM FOR COMMUNICATION STUDY 
Name of School
Title o f Project: Collaborative Competence in Dialogue
Name o f Researchers: Dr Jessica Hobson & Prof Peter Hobson (with  
 and Keren Smith)
Contact Phone N o: 0  
1. I have read and understand the information sheet and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions.
2. Giving consent for my child to participate in the project is voluntary and 
confidential and I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent at any 
time, without giving any reason.
3. I understand that any publication resulting from this research will not identify 
my child (or me) in any way.
Please choose one o f the following options:
□  YES, I consent for Child’s name to take part in the above project on 
communication.
□  NO, I would prefer that Child’s name not participate in this research project.
Your name:   Date:......................
Signature: ...........................................................................................................
Your address: ...........................................................................................................
Researcher: Date:
Signature: .................................................................................
Please return this copy completed to Name of School
127
Appendix 3: Social Feffer Task scoring criteria
128
So c ia l  F e f f e r  T a sk
C hild ID:
Ra ter : □  LR □  KS Oth er:
R a t in g  S t a t u s  □  In d e p e n d e n t  □  J o i n t
2 nd T e s t e r  □  S is s y  □  K e r e n
Observation
Co-creation o f the story________________________________________________
Focus o f  observation. The focus of the observation is on the story as created jointly 
by the tester and the participant. Specifically, we are interested in the degree of 
mutuality in the play. This involves both a) the child’s own ability to generate new 
and creative ideas, and to become invested in and sustain his/or her ideas expressed 
through the play materials and character; as well as his or her propensity to b) be 
responsive to and engage with the ideas and subjective states o f the tester (and the 
tester’s character) in a truly collaborative manner.
Notes:
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2 Story narrative
Focus o f  observation. The focus of the observation is on the joint-ness inherent in 
the story as re-told by the participant. Specifically, we are interested in how ‘what 
went on’ in the co-creation between the tester and participant becomes internalised 
within the participant’s own narrative. This involves investment with the mutual 
story/ideas, as expressed through the materials and characters.
Notes:
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Ratings
Background Ratings____________________________________
A. Attentiveness to and comprehension of task instructions.
0. The participant was inattentive to the task and/or did not understand the instructions. Use 
this score for participants who refused to participate.
1. The participant was attentive to the task and materials, and understood the instructions.
B. Able to show evidence of symbolic ability.
0. The participant was unable to use the materials in a symbolic (not solely functional) way.
1. The participant showed evidence o f  symbolic ability, as expressed by at least one o f  the 
follow ing {tick those that apply}:
  Attributes a false property
  Makes one thing stand for another
  Refers to the presence o f  an absent object
C. Shows the ability to recall details of the story.
0. The participant was unable to give any account o f  what took place in the story. Use this 
score for participants who either fail to recall any o f  the events o f  the story, or whose 
entire story is a fabrication.
1. The participant provides a narrative which includes at least some elements o f  the story 
during the co-creation episode.
Please Note: If the participant scores 0 in total, do not rate subsequent sections. If 
they score a 1 for both sections A and B, rate the story co-creation section. If they 
score 1 for section C, score the story narrative. If they score a 1 on all three items, 
please complete all ratings.
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2 Co-creation of the story
A. Engagement with Materials. These items focus upon the participant’s use
of the materials and objects (including his or her own character) in the creation
of a story.
A l. Creativity
This item is broadly defined as the propensity and/or ability o f  the child to generate new meanings and 
ideas.
0. The participant fails to produce new ideas.
1. The participant is limited in the initiation o f  new ideas -  either in frequency (very few) or 
range (restricted to limited topic), or there is a clear rote/scripted and/or concrete quality to 
any ideas initiated by the participant.
2. The participant often initiates new ideas but these ideas are limited in range, or there may be 
rote/scripted qualities to the ideas.
3. The participant is fluent in the initiation and generation o f  ideas. The ideas are creative, and 
contribute to the flow  and smoothness o f  the story.
A2. Investment with meanings/ideas as expressed through materials
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the meanings and ideas matter to the participant.
0. The participant shows little to no investment in the meanings as expressed through the play 
materials.
1. Use o f  materials is primarily fleeting, rigid or superficial.
2. The participant shows some investment in the meanings as expressed through the play 
materials, but does not sustain the engagement.
3. The participant cares about the ideas and meanings as expressed through the play materials.
A3. Role adoption for own character
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the participant participates in the story through his 
or her own character.
0. The participant makes little or no reference to their own character except when prompted to 
do so.
1. The participant makes some reference to their character, but this lacks evidence o f  role 
adoption. He or she may refer to the character in the 3rd person, or relate similarly to all o f  the 
dolls.
2. The participant refers to and shows a preference for his or her own character. S/he may refer 
to his or her own character in the 3rd person, adopt the character role with a superficial or un­
sustained quality or conveys events in terms o f  actions and events rather than experiences.
3. The participant adopts a role for his or her own character and involves him or herself in 
‘being’ in this role. Here, the participant may refer to his or her own character in the first- 
person. He or she conveys and describes events and experiences from the point-of-view o f  
his or her own character
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B. Engagement with Tester - These items refer to the participant’s
propensity to engage and collaborate with the tester during the co­
creation of the story.
B l. Responsiveness to tester’s ideas
This item is broadly defined in terms o f  the participant’s responsiveness to those ideas introduced by 
the tester.
0. The participant either consistently and actively rejects the ideas o f  the tester or fails to 
register ideas coming from the tester.
1. The participant acknowledges the tester’s ideas (this could be a verbal acknowledgement or a 
physical gesture) but does not adopt, relate to or include them in the story.
2. The participant adopts the tester’s ideas but engages with them in a fleeting or transitory way. 
The ideas o f  the tester are not really incorporated into the participant’s narrative, or 
developed within the flow  o f  the story
3. The participant engages with the tester’s ideas. In doing so, he or she shows signs o f  actively 
incorporating the ideas o f  the tester into the story, evolving and developing them.
B2. Interaction with tester’s character
This item is focussed upon how the participant (in character) interacts with the tester’s character in the 
story narrative.
0. The participant does not interact with the tester’s character and appears unaware o f  the 
character’s subjective states.
1. The participant acknowledges the tester’s character and/or subjective states but there is 
limited if  any sense o f  reciprocity or engagement.
2. The participant acknowledges the tester’s character and/or subjective states and there is clear 
responsiveness to the tester’s character. However, there may be a transient or superficial 
quality to this interaction and the participant’s ability to sustain interaction may be 
inconsistent or require prompting.
3. There is active interaction between the characters, including appropriate responsiveness to 
the subjective states o f  the tester’s character and sustained mutual engagement.
B3. Interaction with Tester
This item is focussed upon how the child responds to and interacts with the tester.
0. The participant fails to acknowledge the tester and appears unaware o f  her as a partner in the 
activity.
1. The participant acknowledges/responds to the tester when prompted, but does not initiate 
interaction.
2. The participant responds to and initiates interaction with the tester but there is an unusual 
quality to the interaction -  e.g. the participant may be controlling rather than collaborative, or 
the interaction may be fleeting or not sustained.
3. The participant responds to, initiates and maintains interaction with the tester such that the 
activity feels truly collaborative.
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3 Story Narrative -  Re-telling
C l. Investment with meanings/ideas as expressed through materials
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the participant relates to the materials in a 
meaningful/engaged way during the story narrative.
0. The participant shows little to no investment in the meanings as expressed through the play 
materials. He or she fails to use or refer to the materials when re-telling the story.
1. The participant uses the materials when re-telling the story -  but in a fleeting, rigid or 
superficial manner.
2. The participant shows some investment in the meanings as expressed through the play 
materials, but does not sustain the engagement.
3. The participant cares about the ideas and meanings as expressed through the play materials, 
and this is clear in the way he or she uses the play materials when re-telling the story.
C2. Role adoption for own character
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the participant re-tells the story through his or her 
own character.
0. The participant makes little or no reference to their own character except when prompted to 
do so.
1. The participant makes some reference to their character, but this lacks evidence o f  role 
adoption. He or she may refer to the character in the 3rd person, or relate similarly to all o f  the 
dolls.
2. The participant refers to and shows a preference for his or her own character. S/he may refer 
to his or her own character in the 3rd person, adopt the character role with a superficial or un­
sustained quality or conveys events in terms o f actions and events rather than experiences.
3. The participant adopts a role for his or her own character and involves him or herself in 
‘being’ in this role. Here, the participant may refer to his or her own character in the first- 
person. He or she conveys and describes events and experiences from the point-of-view o f  
his or her own character.
C3. Role taking in relation to tester’s character
This item is focussed upon how the participant includes the tester’s character in the story narrative.
0. The participant makes little or no reference to the tester’s character except when prompted to 
do so.
1. The participant makes infrequent reference to the tester’s character but this is fleeting and 
lacks evidence o f  relation to the role.
2. The participant makes consistent reference to the tester’s character, but this is done on the 
basis o f  actions rather than experiences. The description may be focussed on what the tester’s 
character did or said -  rather than how the character felt.
3. The participant identifies with the role o f  the tester’s character during the story re-telling. 
Here, he or she may use the tester’s character to act out relevant parts o f  the story as well as 
make clear reference to the tester’s character’s subjective states.
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C4. Overall mutuality of account
This item reflects the degree to which the narrative provided by the participant conveys a sense o f  
mutuality and collaboration.
0. The participant makes little to no reference to the ideas that the tester introduced, unless 
prompted to do so.
1. The participant refers to the tester’s ideas/input in a matter-of-fact or fleeting way, and may 
need to be prompted to elaborate upon these ideas.
2. The participant makes spontaneous reference to the tester’s ideas and contributions. However, 
there is the sense that these are added on rather than part o f  a mutually developed story. The 
participant may seem a bit stuck on his or her own agenda and the story from his or her own 
point-of-view.
3. The participant’s narrative conveys mutuality and collaboration. The ideas o f the tester and 
o f  the child have becom e interwoven into a story which is a joint product. The participant is 
able to ‘b e’ both se lf  and other (tester) in re-telling their joint story.
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Appendix 4: Social Feffer Task administration manual
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Social Feffer Task (SFT)
Administration Manual
Materials
Bag of dolls and props 
Video camera & tripod 
Three chairs and a table 
Two researchers
Time
Story create: 5-7mins
Story re tell: 4 mins (this is flexible but no longer than 10 mins)
Participants
1 Child
Researcher 1: Administers instructions 
Researcher 2: Co creates the story
Overview of the task
In this task the child and Researcher 2 will create a story together using the 
props provided. Researcher 1 will explain the instructions for the task to the 
child and will then leave the room and allow the child and Researcher 2 to 
carry out the instructions. The child will take the role of one of the dolls and 
Researcher 2 will take the role of another.
In the co creation of the story, the props will be used both for their intended
purpose and in a symbolic way. During the task Researcher 2, in the role of
a peer, will make suggestions about how the story could develop and how 
props can be used. These suggestions are standardised (administered in a 
semi structured format) for each participant and specified in the instructions. 
Researcher 2 will also follow the child’s lead and adopt their ideas.
In the second part of the task Researcher 1 will re enter the room. 
Researcher 1 will then ask the child to re tell the story that they created with 
Researcher 2 using the dolls and the props.
Room set up
• The camera should be placed so that it captures all three chairs 
(Researcher 1&2 and child) and the materials on the table.
• Child faces the camera
• Researcher 2 is at right angles to the child
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• Researcher 1 sits directly across from the child but does not obscure 
the camera view
• The figures should be lined up in a row in front of the child so that they 
can view and pick one.
• When the child and Research 2 has picked a doll, Researcher 1 
chooses the 3rd figure according to the instructions. The remaining 
figures are moved to one side. Researcher 2 moves the props in front 
of the child and explains what happens next according to the 
instructions
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Instructions for Researcher 1
Today you and ‘Researcher 2’ are going to use all of these objects to 
make up a story together.
Which one could be you?
• Give the doll that they have chosen to the child and name the doll the 
child’s name
O.k, this is ‘name’
Now ‘Researcher 2’would you like to pick a figure to be you?
O.k. this is ‘Researcher 2’
• Researcher 2 should choose adult figure most similar to their own 
appearance
• Give child and Researcher 2 theirs figures and emphasise who is who 
by name
Now I’m going to choose a third person to be in the story. 
This is Ben/Jenny
• Choose an appropriate third doll. The third figure should be a 
different age, race and gender from the child
• Move the remaining dolls away
You and ‘Researcher 2’ are going to use all these things to make up 
a story. While you make up the story I will be out of the room.
When I come back I want you to tell me the story that you and 
‘Researcher 2 ’ made up using all of the materials
O.k.?
• Ensure that the child appears to have understood the instructions
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• Researcher 2 then leaves the room and waits outside
• Return in 5 mins and check if they are ready. If not, wait 2 mins 
(7mins maximum)
O.k. are you ready?
I’m giving all of the characters to you ‘child’ and I want you to use all 
of the characters and the materials to tell me the story that you made 
up with ‘Researcher 2’
• Researcher 2 doesn’t hold on to any characters
• Encourage the child to demonstrate ‘Can you show me?’
• During the re telling, Researcher 2 should not add any details 
but can be non verbally available to the child by watching them 
tell the story and being interested
• Researcher 1 should use two prompts. When the child seems 
to have finished they should ask them if they would like to add 
anything else. They should also ask if there is anything to be 
added about each character
• It is important that each child receives similar prompting in 
order to keep the task as standardised as possible for each 
participant
O.k. that’s great 
What else happened?
Would you like to add anything else about Ben/Jenny? 
Would you like to add anything else about ‘Researcher 2 ’? 
Would you like to add anything else about ‘Child’?
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Instructions for Researcher 2
• Be the role of a playmate. Try not to instruct the child what to do but 
use modelling, encouragement and mutual play
• Refer to your figure as T and the child’s figure as ‘you’ or their name. 
Refer to Ben/ Jenny in the 3rd person
e.g. “Hey, would you like to come and play with me in the 
garden?”
“Shall we climb a tree?”
“Do you think Ben/ Jenny/ He/ She would like to climb the 
tree?”
• Introduce ideas and actions into the story as specified in the 
standardised instructions. It is also o.k. to suggest new ideas and 
actions into the story as they arise.
• Encourage the child to generate their own ideas. Comment upon 
these ideas and engage/ elaborate on them.
• Ben/ Jenny should be involved with a few actions but not really be a 
central focus. They should always be referred to in the 3rd person.
• Focus on your feelings, thoughts and experiences from the first person 
perspective. Try suggest your feelings, like, dislikes, reactions etc.
e.g. “Ouch that hurts”
“Yummy, I really like that”
“Oh I’m frightened”
“Hooray, that’s fun”
• Encourage interaction between the characters. Speak directly to the 
child’s figure.
e.g. “’Name’ would you like to pick apples?”
“Do you want to play football with me ‘Name’?”
• Try to elicit some emotional/ subjective states from the child
• Try to have fun!
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Standardised ideas
1. Use the ball as a stinging bee. The bee should sting Researcher 2. Show  
fear and pain.
Oh no, I ’m afraid, it’s a bee!
Ouch it stung me! How can we make it better?
Allow the child to use one of the objects to help. If they haven’t already done 
so, suggest that you need medicine from the cup
/ think I need some medicine. Can you get some for me please?
2. Ben/ Jenny uses the magnifying glass as a shovel. Use it to dig a hole. 
Researcher 2 trips over the shovel and falls into the hole. Show anger
Look what’s happened now? I have fallen into the hole. What can 
you use to pull me out of the hole? Please help me
3. Researcher 2 suggests making some tea. Ben/ Jenny can drink some tea. 
Pretend that you didn’t get any tea or didn’t have enough tea. Show  
feeling upset and feeling thirsty
Oh I didn’t have any tea, that isn’t fair 
I ’m so thirsty
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4. Ben/ Jenny play football with the child’s character. You are left out. Show  
feeling left out of the game and lonely
Why don’t we pretend that you play a game of football with Ben/ 
Jenny?
Oh I’m all on my own now and feel left out
Give child opportunity to invite you to join them. If they don’t then asked to 
join in. Show  excitem ent to be playing the game
Can I play with you please?
Yeay! This is funi
5. Encourage the child to use an object with no obvious meaning e.g. the 
coloured hoop
What can this be?
6. Encourage the child to use an object with an obvious meaning e.g. the 
ladder
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Coding guide
Story Co-creation
Focus o f  observation. The focus of the observation is on the story as created jointly 
by the tester and the participant. Specifically, we are interested in the degree of 
mutuality in the play. This involves both
a) the child’s own ability to generate new and creative ideas, and to become invested 
in and sustain his/or her ideas expressed through the play materials and character
b) the child’s responsiveness to and engagement with the ideas and subjective states 
of the tester (and the tester’s character) in a truly collaborative manner.
A. Engagement with Materials. These items focus upon the participant’s use 
of the materials and objects (including his or her own character) in the creation 
of a story.
A1 Creativity
This item is broadly de 
new meanings and ideas.
ined as the propensity and/or ability o f the child to generate
4. The participant fails to produce new ideas.
The child may play along quite happily but doesn’t produce ANY ideas themselves.
5. The participant is limited in the initiation of new ideas -  either in frequency 
(very few) or range (restricted to limited topic), or there is a clear 
rote/scripted and/or concrete quality to any ideas initiated by the participant.
The child produces some ideas but very few. The ideas they produce may also feel 
lacking in creativity- they may be very fixed on one topic or have little fluidity in 
their ideas.
2.b.ebs: This participant is slow to generate ideas and meanings- would probably do 
so more but the tester may have been a little fast to jump in with ideas. Could have 
possibly rated 1 but does generate a few ideas even though not really verbal about 
them.
6. The participant often initiates new ideas but these ideas are limited in range, 
or there may be rote/scripted qualities to the ideas.
Introduces more ideas than participants scoring 1 but there is still a slightly limited 
range or rigid quality to the range of ideas. They may only introduce just a few ideas 
in comparison to those scoring 3.
7. The participant is fluent in the initiation and generation of ideas. The ideas 
are creative, and contribute to the flow and smoothness of the story.
145
Here we would really expect the child to generate a variety o f ideas that are fluid and 
flexible within the story. It is possible that the child may be slightly interested in a 
particular topic but they are able to inject these ideas in a smooth and relevant way.
See 6.b.ws
Reliability and trends on consensus rating
Most o f the discrepancies during the consensus rating seem to occur when Keren 
rates higher than Leah.
Examples
3.b.ws: K3 LI
This participant requires some prompting but does generate a range of ideas:
• Looks at bruise through magnifying glass
• Goes up ladder to look
• Watches TV
• Pool
• “Go to bed all day long”
• Stuck in bucket
• Given that this participant does not seem as fluid or keen to suggest new
ideas and meanings and requires prompting but does not generate a range:
Suggested consensus: 2
4.b.ws K2 LI
This participant is a little slow in generating ideas- requires prompting. She does
generate quite a range once prompted:
• Water the plants
• Not allowed in pool- naughty
• Go and get a plaster/ bandage
• Medicine from cup
• Play catch/ it
• Insects/ bee/ ant
Suggested consensus: 2
See example above of a clear 1
3.b.bhs K3 LI
This participant does generate a range of ideas and meanings:
• Ball as apple
• Magnifying glass as shovel
• Uses hoop to pull out
• Pours tea
• “Maybe we should say sorry and get the ball?
• “Maybe we should go to his house?”
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If this example is compared to 2.b.ebs above, she seems to generate a lot more ideas 
(and is more creative and expressive). However, the generation of these ideas may 
not be quite as fluid or creative as a participant rated 3, e.g. 6.b.ws.
Suggested consensus rating 2
A2 Investment with meanings/ideas as expressed through materials
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the meanings and ideas matter to 
the participant.
4. The participant shows little to no investment in the meanings as expressed 
through the play materials.
The child barely uses the materials, if  at all.
5. Use of materials is primarily fleeting, rigid or superficial.
The child uses the materials a little but this may not be consistent or they may seem 
very dismissive o f them. They may also struggle to really create meanings and 
experiences through the materials or have difficulty in being creative with the use of 
the materials.
6. The participant shows some investment in the meanings as expressed 
through the play materials, but does not sustain the engagement.
This child is likely to use the materials more than rating 1 but may not seem engaged 
consistently. The use o f the materials may seem superficial or rigid at times. They 
may seem less invested in the materials than participants rated 3 so that they are less 
proficient in expressing ideas, meanings or experiences through them.
7. The participant cares about the ideas and meanings as expressed through 
the play materials.
This participant is consistently invested in the materials so that ideas, meanings and 
experiences are expressed with them and through them. There is a sense that they are 
engaged and care about expressions through the materials.
See l.b .rhs, 14.b.ws for good examples of 3
Examples
2.b.rhs K2 L3
This ppt is clearly engaged with the materials and cares about using them and so 
would not be rated 1. He does create some meanings, such as using the magnifying 
glass and fetches some medicine in the cup. However, if we compare him to a rating 
of 3 where the ppt is active and proficient in expressing meanings and experiences 
through the materials in a very engaged way, this ppt falls slightly short. (See e.g. 
l.b.rhs, 14.b.ws)
Suggested consensus: 2
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A3 Role adoption for own character
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the participant participates in the 
story through his or her own character.
4. The participant makes little or no reference to their own character except 
when prompted to do so.
There is no spontaneous expression of self through their figure. They may rarely pick 
up the figure.
5. The participant makes some reference to their character, but this lacks
rHevidence of role adoption. He or she may refer to the character in the 3 
person, or relate similarly to all of the dolls.
The participant refers to their figure and may use it a little but there is little sense that 
they are actually using it to portray “se lf’ or that they identify with the figure. They 
may refer to the dolls in a similar way with little evidence of preference towards their 
figure as “s e lf ’
6. The participant refers to and shows a preference for his or her own 
character. S/he may refer to his or her own character in the 3rd person, 
adopt the character role with a superficial or un-sustained quality or 
conveys events in terms of actions and events rather than experiences.
There is more evidence o f identification than rating 1 as the child may obviously use 
and prefer their own figure. The key element here is whether they relate to the figure 
in a very action based way or whether they express experiences. Experiences may be 
conveyed through subjective states, talking “through” the figure or the way in which 
the story evolves around the character. It is sometimes helpful to watch out for use of 
the magnifying glass- do they hold it to their figure to look through or always look 
through it them self?
7. The participant adopts a role for his or her own character and involves him 
or herself in ‘being’ in this role. Here, the participant may refer to his or her 
own character in the first-person. He or she conveys and describes events 
and experiences from the point-of-view of his or her own character.
This participant will really act at being the figure and taking on the role. Experiences 
are expressed through the character to include points of view, conversation, 
subjective states and events. They may also indicate role adoption by holding the 
magnifying glass to their figure’s eye.
C. Engagement with Tester - These items refer to the participant’s
propensity to engage and collaborate with the tester during the co­
creation of the story.
B1 Responsiveness to tester’s ideas
This item is broadly defined in terms of the participant’s responsiveness to those 
ideas introduced by the tester.
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4. The participant either consistently and actively rejects the ideas of the tester 
or fails to register ideas coming from the tester.
There really is no sense of reciprocity here. There is no sense that they engage with 
the tester’s ideas.
5. The participant acknowledges the tester’s ideas (this could be a verbal 
acknowledgement or a physical gesture) but does not adopt, relate to or 
include them in the story.
The child may take a little notice of the tester’s ideas but doesn’t take them on for 
themselves or evolve them. They don’t really integrate the tester’s ideas into their 
own play. The tester’s ideas may not seem readily accepted or welcomed.
6. The participant adopts the tester’s ideas but engages with them in a fleeting 
or transitory way. The ideas of the tester are not really incorporated into the 
participant’s narrative, or developed within the flow of the story
The participant does acknowledge and take on the tester’s ideas but there is less 
evidence o f them actually engaging with the ideas as they don’t really evolve or 
build upon the tester’s ideas. The child doesn’t seem to integrate the tester’s ideas 
into the story or play as a flowing and growing story line as often or as well as rating
7. The participant engages with the tester’s ideas. In doing so, he or she shows 
signs of actively incorporating the ideas of the tester into the story, evolving 
and developing them.
The participant probably seems comfortable with the tester’s ideas and actively 
incorporates them and builds upon them. The ideas are accepted and welcomed as 
part o f an evolving story.
B2 Interaction with tester’s character
This item is focussed upon how the participant (in character) interacts with the 
tester’s character in the story narrative.
4. The participant does not interact with the tester’s character and appears 
unaware of the character’s subjective states.
The participant does not interact character to character. They may refuse to interact 
in this way and rebuff attempts to interact by the tester or seem unaware o f the 
tester’s character.
5. The participant acknowledges the tester’s character and/or subjective states 
but there is limited if any sense of reciprocity or engagement.
The child is aware of the tester’s character and may acknowledge subjective states 
but does not appear to actively engage with them or respond to them in a 
spontaneous way. Attempts to interact by the tester may appear unwelcome so that it 
doesn’t feel like a mutual exchange. The child may make clear attempts to avoid 
interactions with the tester’s character and engage in solitary play. There is likely to 
be little character to character communication.
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6. The participant acknowledges the tester’s character and/or subjective states 
and there is clear responsiveness to the tester’s character. However, there 
may be a transient or superficial quality to this interaction and the 
participant’s ability to sustain interaction may be inconsistent or require 
prompting.
The child is more open and receptive to interaction with the tester’s character than in 
rating 1. They recognise the tester’s character’s subjective state. This interaction may 
be transient in that they appear to not actively seek out and engage with the tester’s 
character- rather they are more likely to interact character to character when 
encouraged to do so. Their character to character interaction may seem less 
convincing or consistent than in rating 3. It may seem more superficial.
7. There is active interaction between the characters, including appropriate 
responsiveness to the subjective states of the tester’s character and sustained 
mutual engagement.
A high rating requires the child to actively interact character to character which 
includes engaging with and responding to the tester’s character’s subjective state. 
There is likely to be examples of character to character speech. The child may 
actively involve the tester’s character in their narrative and experiences.
B3 Interaction with Tester
This item is focussed upon how the child responds to and interacts with the tester.
4. The participant fails to acknowledge the tester and appears unaware of her 
as a partner in the activity.
The child may engage in solitary play only and rebuff attempts to play mutually.
5. The participant acknowledges/responds to the tester when prompted, but 
does not initiate interaction.
Any interaction may seem superficial or unwelcome- the child may prefer to play in 
a solitary way. The child does not actively engage (through initiating and including 
the tester)with the tester in order to collaboratively complete the task. The interaction 
may be inconsistent or require encouragement.
6. The participant responds to and initiates interaction with the tester but 
there is an unusual quality to the interaction -  e.g. the participant may be 
controlling rather than collaborative, or the interaction may be fleeting or 
not sustained.
The child does interact with the tester more than rating 1 but the quality of the 
interaction is such that it doesn’t feel truly mutual or collaborative. The child may be 
quite dominating or more passive. There isn’t the sense of a truly reciprocal 
exchange as the child and tester work together.
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7. The participant responds to, initiates and maintains interaction with the 
tester such that the activity feels truly collaborative.
There is a sense that the child is open to working in a truly mutual and collaborative 
way so that the focus is on both party’s contribution.
Story Narrative
Focus o f  observation. The focus of the observation is on the joint-ness inherent in 
the story as re-told by the participant. Specifically, we are interested in how ‘what 
went on’ in the co-creation between the tester and participant becomes internalised 
within the participant’s own narrative. This involves investment with the mutual 
story/ideas, as expressed through the materials and characters.
C l Investment with meanings/ideas as expressed through materials
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the participant relates to the 
materials in a meaningful/engaged way during the story narrative.
4. The participant shows little to no investment in the meanings as expressed 
through the play materials. He or she fails to use or refer to the materials 
when re-telling the story.
Child does not really use the play materials to tell the story. May refer to them briefly.
5. The participant uses the materials when re-telling the story -  but in a 
fleeting, rigid or superficial manner.
May refer to, touch or pick up the materials occasionally but does not use them to 
“show” or act out the story. The child’s investment in the materials is not inherent in 
their narrative
6. The participant shows some investment in the meanings as expressed 
through the play materials, but does not sustain the engagement.
The child may use the materials to tell the story a little but is not as active expression 
Or appear as invested in the materials as an inherent component to the story narrative 
as rating 3. They may pick up and put down the materials.
7. The participant cares about the ideas and meanings as expressed through 
the play materials, and this is clear in the way he or she uses the play 
materials when re-telling the story.
The child uses the materials to act out the story and there is a real sense that the 
materials are an integral part of the story telling. This is evident in the way the child 
uses the materials to convey expressions, actions and events.
C2 Role adoption for own character
This item is broadly defined as the extent to which the participant re-tells the story 
through his or her own character.
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4. The participant makes little or no reference to their own character except 
when prompted to do so.
The child may not include their own character or refer to it as “I” or “me”. Little or 
no indication that they identify with the figure as “se lf’.
5. The participant makes some reference to their character, but this lacks 
evidence of role adoption. He or she may refer to the character in the 3rd 
person, or relate similarly to all of the dolls.
The child may refer to their own character in such a way that suggests little personal 
identification. The child may tell the story with little reference to personal role.
6. The participant refers to and shows a preference for his or her own 
character. S/he may refer to his or her own character in the 3rd person, 
adopt the character role with a superficial or un-sustained quality or 
conveys events in terms of actions and events rather than experiences.
The child shows more identification with own character than rating 1 but does not 
express the same level of personal identification or “being” their character as with 
rating 3. The narrative may focus on isolated events rather than a rich description of 
experiences.
7. The participant adopts a role for his or her own character and involves him 
or herself in ‘being’ in this role. Here, the participant may refer to his or her 
own character in the first-person. He or she conveys and describes events 
and experiences from the point-of-view of his or her own character.
The child clearly adopts their character as “se lf’ and narrates a story that includes 
experiences. The child may include points of view, character speech and subjective 
states.
C3 Role taking in relation to tester’s character
This item is focussed upon how the participant includes the tester’s character in the 
story narrative.
4. The participant makes little or no reference to the tester’s character 
except when prompted to do so.
The child neglects the tester’s character and does not describe them as central to 
the story. There is no evidence that they have related to the tester’s character.
5. The participant makes infrequent reference to the tester’s character but 
this is fleeting and lacks evidence of relation to the role.
The child may refer to the tester’s character but does not include them as an 
integral part o f the story. They are unlikely to use the tester’s character to tell the 
story. They mention only actions with no reference to subjective states.
6 . The participant makes consistent reference to the tester’s character, but 
this is done on the basis of actions rather than experiences. The
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description may be focussed on what the tester’s character did or said -  
rather than how the character felt.
The child may often include the tester’s character and may pick up the tester’s 
figure. However, when referring to the tester’s character there is little sense that 
they take on the character’s role or “be” the character. The narrative is action 
based with little sense of experiences or subjective states.
7. The participant identifies with the role of the tester’s character during 
the story re-telling. Here, he or she may use the tester’s character to act 
out relevant parts of the story as well as make clear reference to the 
tester’s character’s subjective states.
The child seems to actively take on the role of the tester’s character when telling the 
story. They act out events and include a rich narrative of experiences. They express 
subjective states and may repeat speech. When they tell the part o f the tester’s 
character they appear to “be” them
C3 Role taking in relation to tester’s character
This item is focussed upon how the participant includes the tester’s character in 
the story narrative.
a. The participant makes little or no reference to the tester’s character 
except when prompted to do so.
Ppt may completely ignore the tester’s character unless prompted.
b. The participant makes infrequent reference to the tester’s character 
but this is fleeting and lacks evidence of relation to the role.
Mentions some action based events but in a fleeting way, may need to be 
prompted. No mention of subjective sates. Probably does not really act out events 
using tester’s doll.
c. The participant makes consistent reference to the tester’s character, 
but this is done on the basis of actions rather than experiences. The 
description may be focussed on what the tester’s character did or said 
-  rather than how the character felt.
A qualitative difference in the way events are described. Little or no reference
to subjective states.
d. The participant identifies with the role of the tester’s character 
during the story re-telling. Here, he or she may use the tester’s 
character to act out relevant parts of the story as well as make clear 
reference to the tester’s character’s subjective states.
Acts out experiences using the tester’s doll. Conveys experiences, subjective
states. Seems really involved with what the tester’s character experienced.
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C4. Overall mutuality of account
This item reflects the degree to which the narrative provided by the participant 
conveys a sense of mutuality and collaboration.
4. The participant makes little to no reference to the ideas that the tester 
introduced, unless prompted to do so.
May only talk about own ideas or may just be limited in their narrative of the
story
5. The participant refers to the tester’s ideas/input in a matter-of-fact or 
fleeting way, and may need to be prompted to elaborate upon these ideas.
For example, may briefly say “this happened, that happened” when prompted but
does not seem engaged with the ideas.
6. The participant makes spontaneous reference to the tester’s ideas and 
contributions. However, there is the sense that these are added on rather 
than part of a mutually developed story. The participant may seem a bit 
stuck on his or her own agenda and the story from his or her own point- 
of-view.
7. The participant’s narrative conveys mutuality and collaboration. The 
ideas of the tester and of the child have become interwoven into a story 
which is a joint product. The participant is able to ‘be’ both self and 
other (tester) in re-telling their joint story
A truly collaborative feel to their account. Is interested in the mutuality of the
account and conveys this when telling the story from both perspectives.
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